

The 2026 Midterms: Forecast and Final-Month Response Scenarios

A Cross-Partisan Analysis of Conventional and Extraordinary Actions

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Part I. The forecast and its evidentiary basis

1. Executive assessment

Chamber	Central forecast	Central 80% interval	D control
House	236 D / 199 R	219 to 255 D	About 92%
Senate	51 D caucus / 49 R	48 to 54 D caucus	About 61%

The House mean is 236.3 Democratic seats, the median 235, and the expected gain 21. A 435-district model at D+8 gives 233.8 seats; a historical member gives 243.8. Their judgmental 75/25 mixture produces the central estimate. The Senate mean is 51.1 Democratic-caucus seats, with a median of 51. Dan Osborn is counted toward that caucus if elected as an explicit modeling assumption, not a reported commitment.

The Senate is substantially more sensitive to modest margin changes. A one-point uniform Republican improvement raises its approximate control probability from 39% to 53%; two points to 67%. House control under the headline mixture rises from about 8% to 13% and 21%, respectively. These are conditional sensitivities, not measured returns from any campaign or administrative action.

The July 16 address deserves separate treatment because foreign data acquisition, intelligence handling, registration failures and system vulnerabilities can have institutional consequences even without a demonstrated changed winner. The released record supports serious inquiry and remediation, but does not establish every step from an allegation to an altered result. Follow-up occurred; its adequacy and completion remain distinct questions.

Part II. Conventional and extraordinary responses

The second part evaluates ordinary political mechanisms and public-policy responses, then tests extraordinary interventions under progressively stronger assumptions about the President's allegations. It assesses feasibility, legal authority, conditional effects and fallout. It provides no demographic targeting, partisan resource-allocation plan or method of obstructing lawful voting.

Reading guide: Sections 1-9 present the model and audit; Section 10 examines the address; Section 11 concludes Part I. Sections 12-18 form Part II. Author information, detailed attributions and one alphabetized bibliography precede the three complete data appendices. All control probabilities are model conditional and have not been validated by out-of-sample calibration.

The framework identifies an unfavorable Republican national environment, separates causal mechanisms from handicapping, and treats district translation as the decisive test. A simple sum of unestimated seat adjustments is useful for transparent hypothesis formation but does not establish identification, statistical independence or predictive accuracy. A modern era baseline near 25 seats is used as descriptive context rather than as a neutral intercept. The 0.78 seat per approval point heuristic is audited with a reproducible regression (Section 3 and Appendix A). The central forecast therefore rests on current district translation plus a retained historical model, not on a stacked ledger.

The Senate cannot be obtained by dividing the House gain by a constant. Only 35 Senate elections occur, Republicans defend 22 of them, and the candidate slate varies sharply. The center is a net Democratic gain of four, with North Carolina, Ohio, Texas and Alaska forming the central flip path, Maine and Iowa as genuine toss-ups, and Michigan and Minnesota as consequential Democratic defensive risks. A 50-50 Senate remains Republican controlled through the vice president.

The control probabilities are model conditional. The House forecast has a substantial upper tail: D+34 is not dismissed. The Senate forecast is far more fragile because a common two or three point polling error reverses chamber control.




Figure 1. Where public estimates sit, in Democratic House seats. Cook and Inside Elections are midpoints of published gain ranges; Sabato is an even split of its toss-ups (this paper's arithmetic, not an official Sabato forecast); Cornell is the September 3 academic model, built on information at least 100 days before the election. Charlie Cook, speaking on ABC's This Week on September 27, said Democrats would pick up the House "in the 20s" and the Senate 51 to 49.

2. What the literature supports, and what it does not

The relevant literature distinguishes forecasting a national vote, translating votes into seats, and explaining why voters move. Bafumi, Erikson and Wlezien show why the generic ballot needs election date adjustment and a separate seat translation. Abramowitz's House models add the governing party's seat exposure; his 2018 wave analysis combines the generic ballot with partisan balancing. Neither approach licenses summing every salient issue as an independent seat loss. The older midterm loss literature (Tuftes; Campbell's surge and decline; Erikson's presidential penalty) and the comparative electoral cycle work of Muller and Louwerse frame the regular direction of the loss and its variable magnitude as separate problems, which is how this paper treats them.

Research on gasoline prices and approval (Harbridge, Krosnick and Wooldridge) supports price salience as a mechanism. It does not supply a validated two seat residual after approval and the generic ballot are conditioned on. Campaign spending is endogenous: donors fund candidates who appear competitive, and challenger spending can

matter differently from incumbent spending. Jacobson's work cautions against converting an aggregate party cash advantage into a fixed seat bonus.

Cantoni and Pons find no average negative turnout effect from strict voter identification laws in their studied setting. That does not mean every voting rule is harmless or that every 2026 change has zero effect. It means a national one seat adjustment requires evidence about affected voters, substitution into other voting methods, and competitive geography. Administrative quality belongs in the uncertainty term or in documented local effects, not in an assumed partisan correction.

Approval and the generic ballot are not identical measurements. Algara and coauthors find that congressional party evaluations have predictive value distinct from presidential approval. Their result strengthens the case for testing multiple indicators; it does not validate arbitrary residual seat adjustments. A model must estimate their joint contribution or keep them in separate forecasting members. Abramowitz's revised Senate research adds the composition of the Senate class, a warning against treating every midterm as the same opportunity set. It points in a Democratic direction for the 2026 class, but the race slate determines how national sentiment becomes seats.

3. Auditing the national assumptions

The generic ballot: D+8 is a scenario, not an exact observation

The working national margin is D+8. Current averages cluster closely around it: FiftyPlusOne D+8 (October 2); Silver Bulletin about D+9 with a likely voter adjustment and a forecast House popular vote of D+7.9; Decision Desk HQ about D+7.9 (September 28); Real Clear Polling D+8.3 at its last reading; an aggregate of six public averages at D+7.4 among registered voters. Individual surveys range from Fox and Echelon at D+7 to D+8 through NBC at D+9 to Emerson at D+11 and YouGov/Economist at D+15 among likely voters. Quinnipiac's 51 to 39 reading on which party should control the House is a related but differently worded question. These support D+8 as a restrained working value, not as a uniquely correct average.

Special elections point the same way with upside. Across 2025 and 2026 contested specials Democrats have run roughly 12 to 13 points ahead of the 2024 presidential margin in the same districts, versus about 10 points in 2018 before a final generic ballot of D+8.4. The overperformance historically compresses by November and is not converted one for one into the fall environment here.

Poll quality should be judged by sampling, field dates, population, wording, mode, likely voter design, transparency and past error. Media reputation or assumed partisan intent is not an adequate weighting rule. Registered voter and likely voter figures are not interchangeable, and overlapping field periods and repeated pollsters are not independent confirmations. The uncertainty model does not assume the Democratic lead is immune to the Republican underestimation seen in some recent elections.

Approval: the 0.78 coefficient does not establish a 36 seat loss

The eight midterms from 1994 through 2022 average a presidential party loss of 24.75 seats. That is a legitimate descriptive statistic, not a neutral baseline evaluated at 50 percent approval. Adding 0.78 times the distance below 50 to that unconditional average counts an approval penalty against an arbitrary reference point and fails to adjust for seats exposed.

An independently reconstructed regression uses presidential party seat change as the outcome and October approval plus pre-election seat holdings as predictors, with approval taken from the American Presidency Project series (early October where available, otherwise the nearest listed fall observation). The data and leave-one-out results are in Appendix A and were replicated independently in the audit.

Historical window	N	Approval slope	Loss at 36%, 220 R	Leave-one-out RMSE
1946 to 2022	20	1.136	41.2	18.3 seats
1978 to 2022	12	1.153	36.3	20.1 seats
1994 to 2022	8	0.793	25.2	14.5 seats

The modern fit is $\text{change} = 152.129 + 0.7928 \times \text{approval} - 0.9359 \times \text{seats defended}$. Its sample means are 48.25 percent approval and 229.9 seats, not 50 and 220, and it has five residual degrees of freedom. The 0.793 slope is close to the inherited 0.78, but the intercept and exposure term produce a 25 seat loss at 36 percent approval, not 36. Using late October readings where available changes the three forecasts to roughly 39, 33 and 24 seat losses. Approval alone therefore brackets a Democratic gain of about 24 to 41 seats and is a diagnostic, not a forecast. No approval coefficient is added to the generic ballot forecast.

Correcting the generic ballot arithmetic
The published Abramowitz equation is $\text{presidential party seat change} = 106.106 - 0.536 \times \text{seats defended} + 2.621 \times \text{the president's party generic ballot margin}$. With 220 Republican seats and a margin of minus 8 it gives minus 32.8, a Democratic gain of about 33, not 34; at a tied generic ballot it gives a loss of 11.8 seats, not 13. The rounded-coefficient calculation was slightly too Democratic. The equation does not know the 2025 to 2026 map changes, so a provisional four seat net Republican map allowance is applied to this historical member only, yielding 243.8 Democratic seats. It is not applied to the district model, whose boundaries already embody redistricting. If the net map effect were zero rather than four, the mixture mean would rise by one seat, not four.

4. The 435-district translation

The Downballot's district level 2024 presidential margins on the current 2026 boundaries provide the structural baseline: 435 unique districts, with the reported margin column used directly because shares are rounded. New maps are in use in Alabama, California, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas and Utah. Missouri must use its 2022 map after the U.S. Supreme Court's September 25 order, and Virginia's map never took effect after the state supreme court voided the enabling amendment on May 8. The reference member roster is not treated as a certified list of current nominees.

Margins are Democratic minus Republican in percentage points. Trump's 1.5 point national edge in 2024 becomes a 9.5 point Democratic swing under a D+8 environment. For district *i*: $\text{forecast margin} = 2024 \text{ presidential margin} + 9.5 + \text{continuity adjustment} + \text{local adjustment}$. This is an explicit uniform swing approximation; presidential and House electorates are not identical.

Continuity contributes plus 2 margin points for a Democratic reference incumbent and minus 2 for a Republican on unchanged districts, zero for open seats, and one point on altered districts where the dataset lacks a comparable 2020 line. The missing 2020 flag is an imperfect proxy for boundary disruption, not a legal determination. Open seat flags use compiled retirement information and rating labels; California 3 and 6 receive no automatic bonus because of moved member ambiguity.

District	Local adjustment	Reason
PA-01	minus 12	Fitzpatrick's exceptional Republican ticket splitting
NY-17	minus 3	Lawler's crossover profile
CA-22	minus 4	Valadao's established local overperformance
TX-28	plus 2	Cuellar's personal Democratic vote
OH-09	plus 3	Kaptur's local Democratic strength
WA-03	plus 2	Perez's demonstrated crossover appeal

These six adjustments are judgmental priors informed by political history and ratings, not regression estimated candidate coefficients. They are disclosed because selective exceptions otherwise create hidden discretion. Removing all six changes the expected seat count only modestly. The model has no exhaustive candidate quality score or fundraising model; the appendix is a complete structural test, not a claim that every race has been handicapped.

Correlated uncertainty, not 435 independent coin flips

Each of 200,000 simulations adds a common national error with a Student *t* distribution (seven degrees of freedom, standard deviation three margin points), a regional normal error of 1.2 points across six regions, a local normal error

of four points, and uniform rounding error of plus or minus 0.5. The adopted national and local scales reflect the audit finding that generic ballot averages a month out have missed by roughly 2.5 to 3.5 points in 2010, 2014 and 2018. These scales are plausible working assumptions, not parameters fitted to held out cycles. The local error covers candidate quality, uneven turnout, presidential to House conversion and omitted polling; it cannot guarantee that systematic effects such as Hispanic shifts or urban and suburban turnout divergence average away.

Model at D+8	Expected D seats	Central 80%	P(D majority)	P(249 or more)
435-district model	233.8	218 to 252	90.2%	13.4%
Historical member with map allowance	243.8	About 228 to 259	not reported separately	not reported separately
75% district / 25% historical mixture	236.3	219 to 255	92.3%	18.7%

The historical member is sampled as a normal seat distribution centered at 243.8 with standard deviation 12, wider than the regression's residual of about nine to allow parameter and map uncertainty. This is a mixture of alternative model distributions, not a claim that their information is independent. With no historical member the forecast is D+19; with equal weights about D+24. Both are below D+34.




Figure 2. Simulated distribution of Democratic House seats under the 75/25 mixture (200,000 draws, seed 20261004). Mean 236.3, median 235, 80 percent range 219 to 255. P(218 or more) 92 percent; P(249 or more) 19 percent.

National margin sensitivity

National D margin	D+4	D+6	D+8	D+10	D+12
Structural expected D seats	217.9	225.3	233.8	243.6	254.7
Gain from 215	2.9	10.3	18.8	28.6	39.7
Seats with positive central margin	214	222	228	239	249

Expected seats sum probabilities, so they need not equal the count of districts with a positive central margin. A D+12 environment, not D+8, is what places about 249 seats on the deterministic winning side. Near D+8 the map yields roughly four to five seats per national point; the historical 2.621 coefficient is a different, cross election average. Neither is an approval coefficient.

5. Explaining the distance from Cook and other forecasts

Cook's September 25 gain range is D+5 to D+15 (220 to 230 seats, with 208 seats favoring Democrats, 205 Republicans and 22 toss-ups, 16 or 17 of them Republican held). Inside Elections' October 1 range is D+2 to D+10; its same day changes moved CA-22 to toss-up, IA-01 and IA-03 to tilt Democratic, and MI-04 to tilt Republican. Sabato's September 29 counts of 213 at least leaning Democratic, 202 Republican and 20 toss-ups split evenly to 223. The 236 seat center is above these readings, but by about 5 to 15 seats rather than the much larger gap of the

D+34 benchmark, and published ranges are not identically defined probability intervals.

Two readings narrow the gap further. Charlie Cook, the newsletter's founder, told ABC on September 27 that Democrats would pick up the House in the 20s, a little more than 20 seats, and the Senate 51 to 49, describing the election as a red undertow rather than a blue wave. Decision Desk HQ's model averages 234 seats with 76 percent control; FiftyPlusOne's median is 242 with 99 percent control; the Cornell model projected 226 from information 100 days out. Prediction markets price House control around 92 percent on Kalshi and Polymarket, with a consensus seat expectation near 232. The professional and model disagreement is narrower and less uniform than the official rating ranges suggest.

Cook's battleground evidence is substantive

Cook's September Battleground District Project surveyed 1,052 likely voters across 37 toss-up and lean districts and found a 49 to 47 Democratic lead where those districts favored Trump by about five points in 2024. The correct comparison is swing: seven points there versus 9.5 nationally in the D+8 scenario. Under uniform swing the battleground should read about D+4.5, so the discrepancy is about 2.5 points, not six. A seven point swing from the national R+1.5 baseline corresponds to roughly a D+5.5 environment, which the sensitivity table places near 222 seats, consistent with restrained handicapping. The sample is about 28 respondents per district: a pooled estimate, not 37 district polls.

The audit tested a complementary reading. For the 83 districts rated by at least one handicapper, converting ratings to implied margins and comparing them with the structural model at a D+5 environment produced an average residual of only 0.4 points. The three rating lists collectively resemble the structural model run at roughly D+5. That supports an effective environment explanation for the gap, although small average residuals can coexist with important local offsets, and the construction (a selected D+5 anchor, shrinkage and capping) is not adopted here as a numerical input. The disagreement can therefore come from three testable sources: the national lead may not reach the decisive districts uniformly; incumbent advantages may exceed the two point continuity term; or ratings may lag a changing environment. This paper does not assume lag merely because the macro number is higher.

Cook rating pool	Districts	Structural expected D wins
Likely or Lean Democratic	23	22.1
Toss-up	22	14.0
Lean Republican	10	4.3
Likely Republican	19	4.4
Safe or unlisted	361	189.0

The structural disagreement is concrete: VA-01 and WI-01 are about 69 percent Democratic in this model despite Lean Republican ratings; MI-04 is about 61 percent; ME-02 and OH-10 about 54 percent despite Likely Republican ratings. Sabato has since moved VA-01 and MI-04 to toss-up. The model expects about eight Democratic wins across Cook's 29 Republican leaning or likely districts and more than half the toss-ups. These are candidates for targeted falsification, not discoveries that supersede local knowledge.

A calibration warning, correctly scoped

Re-running the current map model at the 2024 national baseline of R+1.5 produces about 202 deterministic Democratic winners, below the 215 Democrats elected in 2024. This is not a valid backtest: boundaries, nominees and the open seat roster have changed, and the new maps cost Democrats roughly four to nine seats at the same environment, so the comparable baseline is about 206 to 211. The remaining four to nine seat gap is a possible under modeling of presidential to House conversion and local Democratic overperformance. It is retained as a reason to keep D+34 in the plausible range, not presented as a demonstrated 13 seat bias. A proper comparison would rerun both maps with identical candidates and assumptions.

The 2018 comparison does not establish D+34

Kondik's analysis shows the current map is no more favorable to Republicans than the 2018 map and does not categorically prevent a wave. But applying 2018 performance by partisan category to the current map yields 239 Democratic seats, a gain of 24, ten below 249. Democrats entered 2018 from 194 seats; a 41 seat gain produced 235. Repeating the historical gain rather than the comparable final seat level confuses opportunity with responsiveness. The 239 figure is retained as a separate robustness anchor; it sits three seats above this paper's center. Units also matter: Kondik's relative presidential share categories and Cook PVI are not raw margin points; a four point two party share difference is roughly an eight point margin difference.

Markets are a cross check, not an extra measurement
Kalshi's House control price was about 91 to 92 percent on the reviewed snapshots; the 270toWin consensus table shows a market expectation near 232 seats, and an August Kalshi seat board had its mode near 231. Seat buckets require normalized prices, treatment of spreads and open upper tails, and matching settlement definitions. No market percentile claim is made for 249 seats; the 19 percent probability for 249 or more comes only from the disclosed model mixture. Markets, ratings and national polls share information; their agreement is not three independent experiments.

6. Treatment of the candidate causal factors
The exploratory ledger assigns explicit seat effects to eleven national factors. Each is retained as a mechanism or a sensitivity, but only effects the forecast can substantiate enter the central estimate.

Factor and exploratory effect	
Final treatment	
Modern midterm baseline, minus 25 R	Descriptive history, not a neutral intercept plus penalties.
Approval, minus 11 R	Re-estimated jointly with seat exposure; kept as a diagnostic member, not added to the generic ballot.
Fuel prices, minus 2 R	Retained as a mechanism and forward scenario (gasoline about \$4.37 nationally in early October, up roughly \$1.20 in a year); no independently estimated residual.
Redistricting, plus 4 R	Actual boundaries in the district model; provisional plus 4 only in the historical member.
Access expansion minus 1 R; tightening plus 1 R	Net zero centrally; evaluate documented local impact rather than offsetting invented seats.
Election oversight, plus 1 R	Removed from the central forecast; no verified partisan seat effect. Exclusion is a statement about what can be substantiated, not an estimate of improper voting.
Iran war residual, minus 1 R	Retained as a salient issue and correlated shock (AP-NORC: 71% disapprove of Trump's handling, 69% say not worth fighting); no extra central penalty.
Epstein, 0	Zero as a separate term absent evidence of incremental vote effect.
Republican financial advantage, plus 2 R	No fixed seat award. FEC June 30 totals (\$300.8 million Republican committees versus \$185.6 million Democratic; NRCC \$92.7 million versus DCCC \$79.0 million) include restricted and non House accounts; deployment and outside spending matter more.
Democratic intensity, minus 2 R	Likely voter and turnout uncertainty already in the model; the Pew engagement gap was measured July 6 to 12, not in the final month.
General economy	Affordability, ACA subsidy expiration, tariffs, utility bills and data center demand belong in interpretation and scenarios, not double counted seats.

Other factors worth tracking include abortion and immigration salience; Hispanic, Black and young voter participation; suburban versus rural mobilization; third party candidates; and late undecided consolidation. None receives a free standing national seat bonus without an estimate conditioned on the variables already used.

7. Senate: national conditions through a race-level lens

There are 33 regular Class II contests plus the Florida and Ohio special elections. Republicans defend 22 of the 35, Democrats 13. The chamber starts at 53 Republicans and 47 Democratic caucus members; the 65 seats not up comprise 31 Republicans and 34 Democratic caucus members including the existing Democratic caucusing independents. A net gain of four reaches 51; a gain of three reaches 50 and does not win control.

The transferable information from the House analysis is the national preference and its uncertainty, not the House seat gain. House only effects such as redistricting are not carried over. Each race receives an adjusted forecast margin from state polling, the state's presidential foundation, incumbent or open seat status and candidate characteristics. These margins are transparent judgmental forecasts, not a fitted uniform swing or an optimized poll average.

The simulation uses a Student t common national error (seven degrees of freedom, standard deviation 2.5 points) with independent race noise bringing total uncertainty to 4.5 to 7 points. Ranked choice transfers in Alaska and Maine, a possible Georgia runoff, and the affiliation of independents are approximated rather than fully modeled.




Figure 3. Approximate marginal probability that the Democrat (or non-Republican) wins, for the 14 races that are not safe under the stated assumptions.

Pivotal race	Adjusted margin	Approx. D / non-R win	Latest evidence
North Carolina (Cooper v. Whatley, open R)	D+7	94%	ECU August 31 to September 3: Cooper 46 to 39; poll average near D+9
Georgia (Ossoff, D defense)	D+7	94%	YouGov and Big Data D+10, InsiderAdvantage D+8
New Hampshire (Pappas v. J. Sununu, open D)	D+5	87%	Siena D+5, UNH D+8, Trafalgar D+6
Minnesota (Flanagan v. Tafoya, open D)	D+3.5	74%	InsiderAdvantage D+1, Quantus D+4, co/efficient D+1, TIPP D+2; average about D+2
Ohio special (Brown v. Husted)	D+2.5	70%	Siena D+3, Marist D+8 (RV)
Michigan (El-Sayed v. Rogers, open D)	D+2.5	69%	Fox D+1, Emerson D+2, Siena D+5, Marist D+7
Texas (Talarico v. Paxton, open R)	D+2	66%	Siena D+6, Marist D+6, Fox D+2
Alaska (Peltola v. Sullivan)	D+1	57%	Siena D+7; Quantus Sullivan +0.6; six aggregators average about Peltola +2.4
Iowa (Turek v. Hinson, open R)	D+0.5	54%	Fox D+2, Siena R+1, Quantus R+1, Marist D+8
Maine (Jackson v. Collins)	Tie	50%	Siena Collins +3, UNH statistically tied
Kansas (Hamilton v. Marshall)	R+3	29%	Siena 45 to 45 with Libertarian Graham at 3
South Carolina (Andrews v. D. Graham)	R+3.5	28%	Rasmussen R+5, Trafalgar R+1, InsiderAdvantage R+1
Nebraska (Osborn, I, v. Ricketts)	R+5	20% independent	SurveyUSA Osborn +4; Cook Likely R
Florida special (Nixon v. Moody)	R+7	10%	Thin public polling

A 66 percent call is a meaningful lean, not a safe race. The central flip list is a representative path, not a claim that Texas and Alaska must both flip while Maine and Iowa cannot.

Texas: James Talarico versus Ken Paxton

This is the Paxton-Talarico race, not a generic Republican defending Texas. The October 3 New York Times/Siena release found Talarico at 51 and Paxton at 45 among likely voters; Marist had D+6 and Fox D+2. The forecast uses D+2, below the midpoint of those readings. Paxton's ethics controversies, primary divisions and uneven establishment support can make him weaker than a conventional statewide Republican; Talarico's religious language and affordability focus offer a crossover route. Republican consolidation, national party advertising, turnout composition and undecideds are real counterweights, and candidate weaknesses are not applied again as separate penalties after polls already capture them. Kalshi prices Talarico at 64 to 67 percent.

Michigan: Abdul El-Sayed versus Mike Rogers

This open Democratic seat is more vulnerable than the national environment alone suggests. Siena had El-Sayed 49 to 44; Fox 50 to 49; Emerson 48 to 46; Marist's registered voter reading was larger. The forecast is D+2.5 with five points of total uncertainty. El-Sayed's progressive profile, the controversy over his remarks about Israel and Jewish constituents, and the repair of intraparty relationships matter alongside mobilization among younger and Arab-American voters; Rogers offers a conventional general election profile. The relevant question is coalition behavior, not identity; religion or ethnicity is not a numerical penalty. Markets price El-Sayed near 73 percent, above this paper.

Ohio special: Sherrod Brown versus Jon Husted

Brown's familiarity, economic brand and established ticket splitting create a stronger opportunity than a generic nominee would have. Likely voter readings cluster around D+3 (Siena 49 to 46); Marist's registered voter result was larger. The forecast is D+2.5. Brown's 2024 defeat shows the limits of personal appeal in a Republican leaning state; Husted has the advantages of an appointed incumbent. Utility costs and data center policy supply unusually local economic salience.

Alaska: Mary Peltola versus Dan Sullivan

The evidence is split. Siena's October 3 likely voter result was Peltola 50, Sullivan 43. Quantus Insights' October 2 survey of 758 likely voters had Sullivan 46.1 and Peltola 45.5 on first choices, 46.8 to 46.5 with leaners, with Peltola ahead 56 to 34 among unaffiliated voters and Sullivan offsetting that with rural margins. Alaska Survey Research and AARP had Peltola ahead after ranked choice reallocation (52 to 48 and 53 to 47); co/efficient and Trafalgar had Sullivan narrowly ahead on first preferences. Quantus notes that six public aggregators average about Peltola +2.4; markets price her near 70 to 73 percent. The adjusted center is D+1 with 5.5 points of uncertainty, a slight Democratic edge rather than either the single D+7 poll or an all poll average that mixes stale surveys. Ranked choice transfers are approximated. Another candidate named Daniel J. Sullivan is on the ballot and must not be conflated with the incumbent.

Maine: Troy Jackson versus Susan Collins

The Democratic nominee is Troy Jackson. Siena reported Collins ahead 49 to 46; the University of New Hampshire described the race as statistically tied; Inside Elections moved it to toss-up on September 22. The center is a tie. Collins' crossover coalition and ranked choice voting make a generic Democratic environment insufficient to call the seat. Opposing the president does not imply opposing Collins. Markets lean modestly toward Jackson.

Iowa: Josh Turek versus Ashley Hinson

Siena had Hinson 48, Turek 47; Fox had Turek 49 to 47; Quantus had Hinson ahead by about a point; Marist had Turek by eight. The center is D+0.5. An open Republican seat and Rob Sand's strength in the governor's race may help, but coattails should not be assumed without joint voting evidence.

North Carolina: Roy Cooper versus Michael Whatley

Cooper's statewide record and the open seat distinguish this race from generic North Carolina partisanship. East Carolina University's late August survey had Cooper 46 to 39 with an eight point forced choice lead, and the polling average sits near D+9. The center is D+7. This is the strongest pickup in the central path, but the older poll should not be mistaken for a final month measurement.

New Hampshire: Chris Pappas versus John Sununu

The Republican is John Sununu, not former governor Chris Sununu; the confusion would materially change the reading of popularity and crossover appeal. Siena had Pappas 50 to 45, UNH 50 to 42, Trafalgar 47 to 41. The center is D+5, allowing open seat uncertainty and Republican resources.

Georgia and Minnesota: defend before counting gains

Georgia retains a D+7 center; Ossoff's incumbency and the environment help, and a sub-50 percent result would trigger runoff dynamics outside the simple model. Minnesota is centered at D+3.5 with 5.5 points of uncertainty, about 74 percent Democratic. Six recent polls average about Flanagan +2 (InsiderAdvantage 46 to 45, co/efficient 43 to 42, Quantus 48 to 44, TIPP 44 to 42, with a SurveyUSA tie). Several of these pollsters have Republican connections, so the center is not an uncritical average, but the evidence supports a materially weaker hold than the state's presidential lean implies. Third party choices, undecideds and state governance controversies all matter. Charlie Cook listed Minnesota among the seats in play.

Kansas and Nebraska: crossover opportunities with limits

Kansas pits Adam Hamilton against Roger Marshall, with Libertarian David Graham relevant. Siena had Hamilton and Marshall tied at 45, Graham at 3. The forecast is R+3 rather than a tie because sparse polling and the Republican baseline leave room for late consolidation; Hamilton's ministerial and moderate profile is a genuine candidate factor. Nebraska's independent Dan Osborn faces Pete Ricketts (not Deb Fischer, whom Osborn challenged in 2024). SurveyUSA had Osborn 46 to 42; other evidence and Ricketts' resources warrant substantial uncertainty. The forecast is R+5 with a 20 percent independent win probability. An Osborn victory counts toward the Democratic caucus in this model; this is an assumption, not a claim about a public commitment.

Florida, South Carolina, Mississippi and Kentucky

The outer opportunities remain Republican favored: Florida's Nixon-Moody special at R+7, South Carolina at R+3.5, Mississippi's Colom-Hyde-Smith at R+10 and Kentucky's Booker-Barr at R+12. These are judgmental margins, not invented polls. South Carolina requires a roster correction: Darline Graham was appointed after her brother Lindsey's death in July and won the Republican runoff. She is a political newcomer who has kept a low profile; Rasmussen had her ahead 48 to 43, while Trafalgar and InsiderAdvantage had her ahead by a point, and a Democratic group is spending \$2.5 million for pediatrician Annie Andrews. The forecast gives Andrews about 28 percent. A fresh appointment is not equivalent to the former senator's established personal vote.

Safe seats and the correct class

Appendix B includes every race, including strongholds highly unlikely to flip; the large margins there are regularizing priors, not poll estimates. Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Arizona and Nevada have no regular Senate election this cycle, so their statewide trends are not 2026 pickup opportunities. Montana's divided non-Republican opposition is pooled only as a low probability non-R event.

8. Senate uncertainty and the update plan

Common shift from central race margins	Expected D caucus seats	Expected R seats
3 points toward Republicans	48.5	51.5
2 points toward Republicans	49.3	50.7
Central assumptions	51.1	48.9
2 points toward Democrats	52.7	47.3
3 points toward Democrats	53.4	46.6

The chamber simulation gives about 61 percent Democratic control and 39 percent Republican control, counting Osborn toward the Democratic caucus. Other new independents remain affiliation unresolved (under 1 percent). The 80 percent range of 48 to 54 includes a comfortable Republican hold.

Public estimates span Decision Desk HQ at 56 percent, markets at 64 to 66 percent, and Silver Bulletin and FiftyPlusOne at 71 to 72 percent; FiftyPlusOne's median of 52 seats comes from the long shots (Florida, South

Carolina, Kansas, Nebraska) rather than the toss-ups. The Senate conclusion is a narrow Democratic edge, not an inevitable wave.

Before Election Day: update the national likely voter average with a fixed inclusion rule; verify every map and candidate entry; collect independent polls in Texas, Michigan, Ohio, Alaska, Maine, Iowa and Minnesota; track undecided consolidation, early vote composition and turnout; replace heuristic continuity adjustments with candidate specific historical residuals; and check competitive race spending rather than national committee totals. Audit common national error and partisan nonresponse. Weights are not to be changed to preserve a preferred forecast.

For the House the decisive diagnostic is whether fresh battleground evidence rises from a seven point swing toward 9.5, and whether candidate polling supports the wave beyond ordinary toss-ups. For the Senate, watch whether Paxton's and El-Sayed's candidate effects persist after late advertising, whether Alaska polling repeats in either direction, whether Minnesota tightens further, and whether Collins' personal vote survives. A materially different signal should change the forecast; it should not be explained away as handicapper timidity.

9. Independent audit: what changed and what did not

Claude (Anthropic) reviewed the factor-ledger and district specifications, reproduced the 435 district calculation and the three approval regressions exactly, re-verified ratings, maps and rosters against current sources, and built an alternative blended forecast that landed at 236 House seats and 51 Senate seats. Because both AI systems used the same district data, polling and heuristics, that agreement is not independent confirmation. The audit's value was in identifying omitted evidence and weak assumptions. Its findings were evaluated rather than adopted automatically.

Adopted

- **Wider uncertainty.** House national error raised from two to three points, regional from one to 1.2, local from 3.5 to four; Senate common error from two to 2.5. House mean moved from 235.1 to 236.3, control probability fell from 96.3 to 92.3 percent, the 80 percent interval widened from 222 to 251 to 219 to 255, and P(249 or more) rose from 12.8 to 18.7 percent.
- Senate race calls. Minnesota from about 92 to 74 percent; Alaska from 68 to 57 percent; South Carolina from 16 to 28 percent; Michigan, New Hampshire and Iowa modestly stronger. With Osborn counted toward the Democratic caucus, the reconstructed Senate mean is 51.1 and control probability is about 61 percent.
- **Calibration warning rescope**d to a four to nine seat diagnostic gap after allowing for the new maps (Section 5).
- **Forecast comparisons added:** Charlie Cook's September 27 interview, Decision Desk HQ, FiftyPlusOne, Silver Bulletin and the Cornell model, with their dates and estimands distinguished (a mean, a median, a modal seat bucket and a ratings split are not interchangeable; the September 3 Cornell model is an early forecast, not an October nowcast).

Not adopted, or adopted only as a sensitivity

- **The rating residual adjustment.** It is informative (Section 5) but was constructed at a selected D+5 environment, then shrunk and capped, without a disclosed complete lookup, optimization criterion or code. It is reported as a diagnostic, not entered as a model term.
- **A four anchor blend** (district model, 2018 translation, Abramowitz equation, public models). The anchors are not statistically independent and the public models are retained as cross checks. The 75/25 mixture remains judgmental; moving the district weight between 50 and 75 percent changes the mean by about one seat.

Nebraska caucus assumption. Osborn is counted in the Democratic caucus if elected, as a modeling assumption rather than a reported commitment. A reconstruction using the 35 disclosed inputs, common Student t error (SD 2.5, seven degrees of freedom), independent residual normal error, 1,000,000 draws and seed 20261004 gives 51.1 expected caucus seats and 60.8 percent control. Without Osborn it gives 58.5 percent; a 50 percent affiliation assumption gives about 59.6 percent. The previously reported 64 percent sensitivity is not reproduced.

10. The July 16 presidential address: evidence, institutions and electoral consequences

Research update: October 5, 2026. The forecast inputs remain frozen at October 4. This section examines President Trump's July 16 nationally televised election-security address and the public follow-up through this update. It adds no discretionary seat adjustment to the central forecast.

Why this warrants a separate section

A presidential address alleging foreign compromise, official concealment and domestic registration fraud is potentially a major historical event. Its importance does not depend on whether every allegation ultimately survives scrutiny. The President can initiate investigations, direct executive resources and change the perceived legitimacy of the coming election. Each consequence deserves analysis. Presidential authority increases the significance of the claims; it does not substitute for evidence of their accuracy.

The address joined five bodies of material: Chinese acquisition of voter data, alleged suppression inside intelligence agencies, vulnerabilities in election technology, the Muskegon registration investigation, and DHS estimates of noncitizen registrations. It also criticized mail ballots and California's counting timetable, demanded investigation and potential prosecution, urged citizenship and identification legislation, and attacked broadcasters that did not carry the speech on their main channels. Its opening economic and social claims are background framing rather than an additional election-security finding. (Trump, July 16.)

The inference ladder

Stage	What must be established
1. Collection or vulnerability	Authentic records, exposed information or a reproducible weakness.
2. Exploitation	An actor actually used the weakness or data in a relevant election.
3. Ballot effect	Eligible votes were lost, ineligible votes counted, or valid choices changed.
4. Outcome effect	The net differential exceeded a particular contest's certified margin.
5. Forecast effect	A prospective change in preferences, participation or lawful administration remains unabsorbed by current polling.

These are different propositions. Evidence at the first stage can justify immediate protection without proving the fourth. Conversely, failure to prove a changed result does not erase a real privacy breach or excuse forged applications. The paper evaluates both kinds of error: overstating wrongdoing and dismissing a genuine vulnerability because the ultimate electoral consequence is unproved.

10.1 Chinese voter data: a serious breach, with an unresolved electoral chain

What the strongest supporting evidence establishes

The released China collection includes intelligence reports, an 18-state memorandum, later reporting on six-state registration data, internal coordination emails and an August 2020 intelligence assessment. The July 30 White House fact sheet, approved by ODNI, NSA, CIA and DHS leadership, asserts acquisition of as many as 220 million Americans' registration data, including nonpublic information, and describes a Chinese cyber actor obtaining data stored on commercial websites in 2022. Treating the entire episode as merely downloading public voter lists would fail to address this official counterevidence. (White House, July 16 collection; July 30.)

One especially important internal contrast is the revised six-state notice. Its title and text describe publicly available registration information downloaded from commercial websites in January 2022, acknowledge that the actor's actual collection motive was unknown, and say the information was passed to appropriate agencies for a network-defense response. This does not refute the July 30 claim that other material was nonpublic. It does show why the released episodes must be evaluated separately rather than uniformly labeled secret-data theft or unreported state-system compromise. (White House, revised six-state notice.)

Nevertheless, possession of a copied dataset is not identical to administrative write access to a state's active registration system. Buying, stealing and hacking describe different acquisition routes. A record count needs deduplication, dates and provenance before it can be read as an equal count of unique, currently eligible people. The distinction matters particularly when datasets cover several years or vendors. The released material should be reconciled record by record with the headline total, rather than multiplying the total directly by an assumed voting rate.

Plausible consequences, and missing links

The immediate risks include exposure of personal information, targeted deception, impersonation attempts and disruption of registration services. A more demanding outcome claim requires evidence that the holder obtained operational access, used it, passed downstream identity or ballot safeguards, and produced a measurable net effect. Acquisition can also support intelligence collection unrelated to a particular election. Motive, capability and actual execution must therefore be assessed separately.

The relevant counterweight is the March 2021 intelligence assessment of the 2020 election. It reported no indications that a foreign actor altered technical election processes. Its scope explicitly did not estimate electoral impact. The China dissent assessed some efforts to denigrate Trump, but also agreed that available information did not show Chinese interference in election processes. This is an important qualified conclusion, not a universal proof that foreign operations or data theft never occurred. (ODNI, March 2021.)

What would change the forecast

An independently reproducible finding of current operational compromise would justify additional uncertainty in affected jurisdictions and immediate remediation. A verified finding of counted improper ballots would enter a contest-specific audit against its margin. A credible new disclosure that moves vote intention in repeated, methodologically comparable surveys would enter the national or local polling inputs. A dramatic retrospective headline alone does not supply the magnitude or direction of a November vote shift.

Assessment: data-security concerns merit serious treatment. The public record reviewed here does not establish the additional chain from the 220 million headline to altered U.S. congressional outcomes. The evidence required to cross that gap is identifiable; it should not be assumed.

10.2 Suppression, analytic disagreement and raw intelligence

The strongest version of the concealment hypothesis

The China document package contains internal email exchanges about presidential briefing treatment and disagreements over the China assessment. The speech characterized selected passages as deliberate suppression and referred to a shadow government. The appropriate question is specific: did officials knowingly exclude materially reliable reporting for an improper political purpose, rather than exercise ordinary source evaluation or classification procedures? A complete briefing and dissemination history, contemporaneous reasoning and the underlying source assessments would be needed to answer it. (White House, China collection.)

The November 23 email is narrower than the speech's characterization. Its writer said the writer had not seen the briefing draft, described another person's characterization, and expressed concern about wording away from elections. That is a contemporaneous concern worth investigating, but not a first-person admission of withholding information from the President. The same chain discusses making reporting usable for the post-election assessment. Full draft versions and distribution logs would discriminate between the competing interpretations. (White House, NSA email chain, November 23.)

Deliberate editing is a fact about a production process, not by itself a finding of criminal intent. A passage selected from an email chain cannot establish what the President received elsewhere, what Congress received through other channels, or whether the omitted item was corroborated. Yet neither routine editing nor later publication automatically exonerates an earlier improper withholding decision. The strongest analysis keeps that possibility open while requiring evidence of purpose and consequence.

Counterevidence inside the same release

The October 5-6, 2020 coordination exchange explicitly discusses publishing an alternative China analysis, labeling it as a minority view, and including a fair statement of the mainline assessment. That is evidence of a documented analytic dispute. It weighs against a sweeping claim that every contrary view was erased. The March 2021 public assessment also disclosed the China dissent. Neither document alone resolves whether particular raw reports were improperly kept out of earlier presidential briefings. (White House, October coordination emails; ODNI, March 2021.)

Counterfeit ballots, paid journalists and destruction claims

The FBI Albany report explicitly labels itself unevaluated intelligence, describes indirect source access and cautions receiving agencies against acting on it without FBI coordination. Its unredacted substance concerns allegedly fraudulent drivers' licenses that could facilitate voting for Biden. The speech's counterfeit-ballot characterization therefore needs separate corroboration. This is stronger than a generic warning about uncertain sources: the document itself provides the limitation. (White House, FBI Albany information report.)

An FBI intelligence-information report concerning an alleged Chinese counterfeit-ballot operation is a lead requiring corroboration. The existence of a report verifies that an allegation entered government channels; it does not verify that ballots were produced, distributed, accepted or counted. Source reliability, independent physical or financial evidence, and matching election records are essential. A warning or investigative lead must not be promoted into a proven national ballot effect. (White House, FBI Albany report and briefing handout.)

The CIA reporting on Chinese efforts to influence business leaders and journalists raises a different evidentiary question: proposed recruitment or payment versus completed transactions, identifiable recipients and measurable influence. The burn-bag allegation similarly requires authenticated custody records, content, retention obligations and evidence of who ordered destruction. Neither allegation receives a seat estimate merely because it is politically explosive. The present section makes no finding of individual criminal liability.

Institutional implications can still be substantial without a proved changed election: impaired briefing quality, distorted oversight and weakened public trust. The appropriate remedy is a source-sensitive inspector-general or congressional inquiry with competing explanations tested against the same complete record. Prosecution requires a separate legal and evidentiary showing. Presidential instructions to investigate are not the completed inquiry.

10.3 Voting technology: vulnerabilities are real, audit design matters

Read the entire assessment, including its limiting conclusions

The January 15, 2020 NIC memorandum distinguishes registration databases, pollbooks and public-facing reporting systems from the certified vote count. Its discussion recognizes attack capability but also notes that interference with displayed results can create confusion without changing independently stored certified totals. It warns that a real intrusion can be paired with an exaggerated claim of electoral manipulation. Those qualifications are central to interpreting the material presented in the speech. (NIC, January 2020, especially pages 4-5.)

The CISA report released in July 2026 is also substantive evidence for the President's concern. It describes network weaknesses, vendor disclosure problems and certification practices that can obstruct timely patching. It reports that owners or operators were notified of identified vulnerabilities. It discusses a ballot-marking device whose machine-readable barcode could diverge from the voter's visible selections, and says CISA could not itself examine the Puerto Rico devices discussed in a separate contractor report. These distinctions prevent a broad claim of either universal safety or universal compromise. (CISA, July 13 report.)

Why paper alone is insufficient

A paper artifact protects an election only if it reliably records the voter's choices, remains under documented custody, and is actually used in an appropriate audit. Re-reading an unverified barcode can reproduce a machine's error. Comparing human-readable selections with reported totals addresses a different failure mode. An audit must be sized to the contest margin and expand when discrepancies warrant it. A security review should state exactly which representation it tests and which attacks remain outside its coverage.

The June 29 Venezuela note explicitly says that the intelligence did not definitively confirm successful large-scale electronic fraud in specific Venezuelan elections. It distinguishes technically possible methods, limited sourcing and an alternative devil's-advocacy analysis from the baseline assessment, which maintained that other factors better explained outcomes. The note also says it is not a comprehensive reassessment. These are substantive limitations on the speech's assertion of a demonstrated, audit-proof operation. The Venezuela reporting concerns a different election environment. A foreign account of digital manipulation can identify a threat hypothesis, but its application to U.S. jurisdictions requires a demonstrated common mechanism, comparable access and an explanation of why independent U.S. records and audits would fail. The speech's undetectability claim cannot be generalized across all audits merely from a description of one foreign operation. (White House, Venezuela intelligence memorandum, June 29.)

Electoral and operational consequences

Vulnerabilities can cause delays, provisional voting, disrupted access, litigation and lost confidence even when totals remain accurate. Forecasting these effects requires an affected-jurisdiction list, current patch status, fallback procedures and evidence of actual disruption. Demonstrated compromise of one network does not justify shifting every district by the same amount. Nor does a successful audit prove every component invulnerable.

The operational priority is a published remediation inventory: exposure, mitigation, verification and remaining risk. Late system changes introduce their own risks, so testing, certification and continuity planning must be explicit. The appropriate security standard is resilient, verifiable counting with lawful access, rather than an impossible promise that no attack can ever be attempted.

10.4 Registration fraud, citizenship matches and counting delays

Muskegon: applications, ballots and outcomes are distinct

The Michigan package contains FBI interviews, allegedly false registration applications, investigative timelines and prosecution-declination material. These are appropriate grounds for close investigation of the canvassing operation and its incentives. A fraudulent application can be criminal even if an election clerk rejects it. The separate electoral question is whether a corresponding registration became active, a ballot was issued, and that ballot was accepted and counted. An interview describing a voter receiving an unsolicited ballot would warrant tracing that chain; receipt itself does not establish a counted vote. (White House, Michigan investigation collection.)

Specific records make the case more concrete. A May 19, 2023 database review of 107 applications returned no results for 91 named individuals; of the 16 identified people, only four had matching signatures on file. Database nonmatches warrant investigation, but are not proof that every unmatched person was fictitious. The declination chain authorized a preliminary inquiry and sought detailed assessments of fraudulent or inaccurate applications. A separate complaint records a woman saying she shredded the mailed item she believed was a ballot. These records support a serious application-integrity inquiry without demonstrating a counted-ballot total. (White House, Michigan records dated May 19, 2023; April 1, 2021; October 5, 2021.)

A prosecution delay or declination should be tested against the actual explanation, evidence, offense elements and comparable cases. It may reflect poor enforcement, evidentiary difficulty or improper intervention. The absence of charges cannot select among those explanations by itself. Likewise, counting allegedly forged forms is not a valid method of estimating net Democratic votes. The paper requires a ballot linkage and geographic distribution before translating any case into seats.

DHS totals: the denominator and validation protocol are missing

The July DHS summary claims more than 250,000 noncitizen registrations in California, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Nevada. Separately it reports more than 68 million registration records processed through SAVE in 25 states, over 28,000 identified noncitizen registrations, and over 400,000 deceased registrants. Those are different exercises and denominators; they must not be added or treated as counts of votes. The summary does not provide a reproducible person-level validation protocol for the speech's roughly 278,000 figure. (DHS, Alien Voter Registration Summary.)

A rigorous reconciliation would distinguish confirmed current noncitizens from possible matches, stale immigration status, naturalization since the original record, duplicate records and mistaken identity. It would then distinguish registration from voting, federal from local elections, and attempted ballots from accepted ballots. False positives can remove eligible citizens; false negatives leave actual ineligibility undetected. The appropriate uncertainty is about both errors, not simply whether one likes the headline.

A documented counterexample to blanket reassurance

On July 21, New Jersey Governor Mikie Sherrill acknowledged a software error that registered about 6,600 people who had answered that they were not citizens. Her preliminary analysis said fewer than 400 newly registered individuals voted, across Democratic, Republican and unaffiliated registrations. She announced investigation, removal and vendor replacement. This is a serious administrative failure acknowledged by an official politically opposed to Trump. It neither validates the national headline nor establishes the partisan direction or net effect on a particular contest. (New Jersey governor, July 21.)

California's June 2 primary had a published timetable: most ballots reported by June 15, county completion by July 2, statewide certification July 10. Cure, provisional and other exceptional ballots require additional processing. The elapsed period merits evaluation for transparency and efficiency, but certification on the announced statutory timetable is not itself evidence of fraudulent counting. (California secretary of state, June 2.)

10.5 Follow-up and the media-polarization hypothesis

There was follow-up; its completion is a different question

The July 30 interagency-approved White House fact sheet was a substantive follow-up to the address. New Jersey's July 21 disclosure initiated a state response. The September 28 defense announcement described a directive for Cyber Command and intelligence support against foreign election threats; it was dated September 22. This was a cyber and intelligence action, not a directive to station troops at polling places. These events preclude saying that the address received no follow-up. (White House, July 30; New Jersey, July 21; Department of Defense, September 28 announcement and September 22 memorandum.)

Completion requires more than announcements. The public needs reconciled citizenship figures, findings on the briefing dispute, current remediation status, and disposition of specific investigative leads. CREW's September records lawsuit sought the underlying noncitizen-voting documentation; the filing establishes a records dispute, not that the numbers are true or false. Reporting on the broader machine inquiry likewise is not a comprehensive judicial finding. A missing public final report should be described as an unresolved disclosure gap, rather than proof of either concealment or innocence. (CREW, September 29.)

What the broadcast choices show

Contemporaneous reporting described ABC and NBC declining to interrupt their principal television schedules while offering streaming coverage; other outlets carried all or portions of the address. Trump threatened licenses over the refusal. This was selective carriage and editorial framing, not a total information blackout. It remains reasonable to ask whether the treatment minimized a potentially consequential disclosure. Answering that requires evidence beyond the carriage decision itself. (Reuters, July 16 network report.)

The proposed establishment rally-around effect is a testable explanation. Alternatives include judgment about corroboration, prior experience with election allegations, expected audience demand and competition for a limited broadcast schedule. Similar choices by different organizations can emerge from shared incentives without coordination. Conversely, the absence of explicit coordination does not establish balanced coverage. The inquiry should code airtime, placement, framing, corrections and attention to the primary documents, applying the same categories across outlets.

Polarization can mute consensus while magnifying institutional consequences

A shared national broadcast once offered a more plausible route to a common interpretation. Fragmented audiences can instead receive different selections of the same event. Supporters may see disclosure and opponents may see an effort to delegitimize an expected defeat. Each camp can mobilize while the aggregate vote intention barely moves. That is a mechanism to test, not a demonstrated causal effect of this particular speech.

A useful design would compare pre-address and post-address respondents in a panel, record exposure and prior trust, and follow later beliefs, vote intention and participation. Self-selected viewers cannot provide a clean treatment comparison. Other July news and campaign developments confound a simple before-and-after poll. Historical importance and immediate seat movement are therefore separate outcomes: an address can influence investigations and legitimacy without producing a measurable national swing.

10.6 Probabilities and House-Senate consequences

The paper assigns probabilities to election outcomes under stated model assumptions. It does not assign invented numerical probabilities to criminal guilt, the correctness of an unreconciled match list or a coordinated media cover-up. The documents are neither independent observations nor a representative sample. Multiplying their apparent corroboration would produce false precision. Authenticity, interpretation and electoral consequence require separate assessments.

Proposition	Assessment of the reviewed public record
Material security vulnerabilities exist	Strong support, including the released NIC and CISA material.
Some erroneous noncitizen registrations occurred	Strong support for the specific New Jersey software episode.
Every person in the DHS headline is a validated current noncitizen registrant	Not reproducible from the released summary; validation and error rates needed.
An improper political briefing cover-up occurred	Unresolved; selected emails and documented analytic disagreement do not determine motive.
The released material establishes changed U.S. election winners	Not established by the reviewed evidence.
The speech caused a particular November vote shift	Not estimated; no adequate exposure-based causal study is available here.

Reconstructed conditional scenarios

The table shifts the Democratic margin by the stated number of percentage points. House shifts are applied to the national generic-ballot environment and all district centers; Senate shifts are applied to all 35 race centers as a separate illustrative assumption. Equal House and Senate shifts are not an estimated transfer coefficient. Means are expected seats, not a prediction that fractional seats can occur.

D margin change	House mean D / R	P(D House)	Senate mean D caucus / R*	P(D Senate)
-2 points	228.6 / 206.4	79%	49.3 / 50.7	33%
-1 points	232.3 / 202.7	87%	50.2 / 49.8	47%
+0 points	236.2 / 198.8	92%	51.1 / 48.9	61%
+1 points	240.4 / 194.6	95%	51.9 / 48.1	73%
+2 points	244.9 / 190.1	97%	52.7 / 47.3	83%

House: 200,000 draws, seed 20261005, disclosed district inputs and 75/25 mixture. Senate: 1,000,000 draws, seed 20261004, disclosed margins and total SDs, shared Student t error (df 7, SD 2.5), residual normal error. Osborn counts toward the D caucus; ID, SD and MT opposition winners remain unassigned. *The displayed Senate complement is an approximate R count because these very small unresolved probabilities are omitted. Base reconstruction differs trivially from the published 236.3 and 60.8% through simulation variation and affiliation treatment.

A two-point Republican improvement still leaves Democrats favored for the House, at about 79% control, but reduces Democratic Senate control to about 33%. One point lowers the Senate estimate to about 47%. The Senate is thus more fragile. These are conditional responses to specified margin changes, not probabilities that the speech will produce those changes, and not effects to add to the baseline.

10.7 From allegations to a forecast update

Direct ballot arithmetic is much smaller than headline counts imply

Suppose a hypothetical statewide audit identifies 10,000 actually counted improper ballots in a contest with four million votes. If every ballot favored the same candidate, removing them would change that candidate's margin by roughly 0.25 percentage points, subject to the denominator correction. If the split were 60-40, the net change would be about 0.05 points. Registration entries alone produce neither effect. This is arithmetic to explain the required evidence, not an estimate of actual improper votes or partisan preferences.

Geography then determines seat consequences. A statewide net effect counts fully toward a Senate margin. The same ballots concentrated in a safe House district can change no House seat. Conversely, a much smaller verified discrepancy can be decisive in an exceptionally close contest. Aggregate totals must be allocated to elections and jurisdictions before the paper can estimate a seat effect. There is no defensible national seat conversion from a raw registration count.

Identification, deceased records and mail ballots

The speech also invoked absent ID requirements, deceased registrants and circulating mail ballots. NCSL's September 3 survey reports that 36 states request or require identification at the polls; other jurisdictions use different verification methods. Identity verification and proof of citizenship are different tests. A deceased person remaining on a roll is not evidence that a ballot was cast in that person's name. A mailed ballot can be unused, rejected or replaced; a concrete fraud inquiry must trace issuance, custody, acceptance and duplicate prevention. These claims therefore warrant procedural review and ballot-level evidence, rather than an assumption that every exposed record generates an improper vote. (NCSL, September 2026; DHS, July summary.)

Separate preference, participation, administration and certification

New corroborated findings can change preferences or participation. Lawful registration corrections, ballot curing and disruption can change which valid votes are counted. Litigation can change procedures or the timing of certification. These channels may overlap, and the direction can differ by race. A national preference update belongs in the generic ballot or the common Senate environment; a specific administrative change belongs in a local input. A delayed certification should not be relabeled as an ordinary vote swing.

The baseline is already dated after the address. Any July persuasion or mobilization effect present in October polls is already included. Adding a separate speech bonus would double count it. A renewed address warrants an update only if genuinely new evidence, exposure or administrative consequences change the current information set. Repetition alone supplies neither a probability of persuasion nor a seat increment.

What would warrant changing the central forecast

First, repeated polling should show a shift exceeding ordinary sampling and house-effect variation, with stable definitions and dates. Second, a jurisdiction-specific finding should document scope, affected voters, remedy and expected lawful ballot consequences. Third, a material unresolved disruption may justify wider local uncertainty even without a known directional mean. Fourth, a certified audit finding must be evaluated against the actual contest margin. Each update should disclose which input changed and why.

The analysis therefore retains House 236 D / 199 R, about 92% Democratic control, and Senate 51 Democratic caucus / 49 R, about 61% Democratic control. It adds a substantial institutional risk discussion and a reproducible conditional sensitivity, while leaving the mean untouched in the absence of an identified new vote effect. The absence of such an estimate is a substantive conclusion about evidence, not a judgment that the speech was unimportant.

11. Conclusion to Part I

The central House forecast is a Democratic gain of 21 seats, producing 236 Democrats and 199 Republicans. Its conditional Democratic-control probability is about 92%, with about a 19% probability of 249 or more Democratic seats. The central Senate forecast is a net Democratic-caucus gain of four, yielding 51 to 49, with about 61% Democratic control. Osborn is counted toward the Democratic caucus if elected. Both intervals allow outcomes materially different from the central estimate.

The contribution is explicit map translation, corrected arithmetic, a reconstructed approval test, race-level Senate reasoning, disclosure of the full input lists and critical review of the presidential address. It is not demonstrated superiority to professional forecasts. The July address adds important institutional questions without supplying a separately identified October vote adjustment.

Shared limits and the transition to Part II

The analyses share district data and judgmental continuity adjustments. Neither supplies an exhaustive candidate-quality or fundraising model or completed out-of-sample backtest. Several Senate states have thin or partisan polling. Uniform swing is an approximation that can miss changing electoral geography. These limits apply to the conditional probabilities in both parts.

Part II evaluates conventional developments and extraordinary public responses. It preserves the distinction between a proposal being legally and administratively possible, the proposal actually changing preferences or participation, and a specified margin change affecting chamber control. The direction and size of an intervention cannot be read directly from the forecast.

Part II. Final-Month Response Scenarios

12. Conventional mechanisms: what could change the environment

Parties confronting an adverse late environment face familiar channels of recovery: improved economic conditions, credible policy delivery, candidate-specific evaluation, changes in lawful participation, and changes in public information. This section evaluates such mechanisms as analytic scenarios, applying the same evidentiary standard to either party. It does not claim that any message, expenditure or appearance has an identified causal return.

Five substantive priorities for public-policy evaluation

Priority	Concrete policy or analytic test	Forecast treatment
Household costs	Relief must reach households, with costs, timing and beneficiaries disclosed.	Update polling or observed local conditions; no separate automatic bonus.
Competence and accountability	Compare promised action with completed delivery and verifiable records.	Test sustained movement in approval and vote intention.
Candidate-specific information	Evaluate documented conduct, debates and policy positions using the same standard across candidates.	Update the affected race only when evidence supports a change.
Lawful participation and administration	Accurate voting information, accessible procedures, staffing and timely correction of errors.	Separate participation changes from counted improper ballots.
Evidence-based oversight	Publish security findings and remedies with uncertainty and independent scrutiny.	Assess confidence, disruption and local effects separately.

These priorities are compatible with vigorous political disagreement. Accountability can include criticism of opponents and of the administration itself. What the forecast cannot do is convert every plausible argument into an independent seat gain. Several channels operate through the same approval or generic-ballot measure and would otherwise be counted twice.

What counts as an improvement

An announcement, a favorable news cycle, higher spending and a change in actual voting behavior are four different outcomes. A proposal may be administratively feasible but electorally negligible. A nationally important reform may have almost no effect within the remaining month. Conversely, a modest administrative failure can be decisive in an unusually close contest. Effects must be measured at the level where they occur.

12.1 Household costs, policy delivery and the approval channel

Fuel prices: salience does not identify an intervention effect

Malpert's central economic hypothesis is that frequently purchased, prominently displayed fuel prices serve as a repeated signal of governing performance. The literature discussed in Part I supports treating this as a plausible mechanism. The next step is to distinguish a change in wholesale energy conditions, a change at the retail pump, household recognition of that change, and a resulting change in congressional preference. These steps have different timing and need not all occur before Election Day.

A supply release, temporary tax change or diplomatic development should therefore be assessed on quantity, implementation authority, timing, incidence and fiscal or strategic cost. A price decline cannot simply be attributed to the latest announcement; seasonal demand, crude prices, refining and inventories can change simultaneously. An announcement of future relief has a different evidentiary status from a verified fall in prices already paid by households.

War and international developments

Foreign policy can affect the election through prices, perceived competence, security and casualties. The direction of those channels can conflict. A diplomatic development may reduce economic pressure while creating a separate argument about national security. The model contains no fitted coefficient that translates a ceasefire announcement, a shipping development or a military action into a fixed number of congressional seats. Decisions concerning war must be evaluated on their substantive consequences, rather than made into an election intervention.

Approval arithmetic and its limits

The reconstructed approval regressions imply about 4.0, 5.7 or 5.8 additional presidential-party seats for a five-point approval improvement, depending on the historical window, holding the model's other variable fixed. These are diagnostic associations with substantial predictive error. They do not establish that an administration can produce those approval points or that the resulting seat change should be added to a forecast already conditioned on the generic ballot.

Near D+8, the headline House mixture changes by approximately four seats for one margin point. Thus a policy development that actually shifts congressional preferences by one point would have a material model consequence. The paper does not assume that a particular gasoline price change, tax proposal or foreign-policy event produces that point. The missing causal link must remain visible.

Evaluation standard

A serious assessment records when a measure becomes effective, whether households experience it, whether perceptions change, and whether vote intention moves in comparable repeated surveys. Early ballots reduce the fraction of votes still exposed to late developments, but they do not reveal the preferences of everyone who has not yet voted. No single national timetable captures every state's process.

12.2 Candidates, organization and public information

Candidate effects need evidence beyond the national margin

Part I already recognizes exceptional local incumbency and candidate effects. This prevents the national environment from mechanically determining every contest. A newly documented scandal, debate performance or policy position may justify a local update, but news volume alone is insufficient. A polling change should survive checks for sampling variation, house effects, field dates and population differences. A report about misconduct must distinguish an allegation, a corroborated fact and an adjudicated finding.

Participation is not a direct readout of persuasion

Changes in enthusiasm, registration and early-vote volume can indicate participation patterns, but they do not uniquely identify final vote shares. High early voting may substitute for Election Day voting rather than add votes. Party registration does not prove an individual's choice. A candidate who underperforms a previous presidential result can be losing support, facing a different electorate, or both. The presidential result alone cannot establish that the problem is exclusively turnout.

For illustration, starting with a two-party D+8 division of 54 to 46, a four-percent relative increase in Republican votes with Democratic votes fixed yields about D+6.05. A switch by two percent of all voters from one party to the other moves the two-party margin by four points. These identities clarify units. They are not estimates of reachable voters, program effectiveness or cost.

Why closeness is not return on spending

Claude's supplied paper correctly asks how a race-level margin change affects chamber control. A probability derivative measures sensitivity to an assumed vote change. It does not show how much spending, candidate activity or public communication produces that change. Cost, saturation, substitution among activities and the opponent's response all intervene. A national or state comparison of financial efficiency requires a separate response model that neither paper estimates.

Public appearances and repeated claims

Presidential involvement can produce several opposing responses: greater attention, reinforcement of supporters, heightened opposition and changes in evaluations of individual candidates. The paper has no identified net effect for a presidential visit or broadcast. Similarly, repeated discussion of election security can reassure some people and discourage others. Neither effect can be assumed to dominate everywhere.

The supplied paper also contains a calendar inconsistency: its general schedule places Minnesota early voting in October, while its Minnesota discussion places it in September. The official state toolkit gives September 18. This review uses the official date and does not infer a uniform national voting window. (Minnesota Secretary of State, 2026.)

The constructive public-information standard is accuracy, accessible explanations and correction of errors. Officials and candidates can describe what policy has changed, what findings are established, and what remains uncertain. The analyst should then measure preference and participation responses without presuming the intended effect occurred. This is especially important when the issue concerns confidence in lawful voting itself.

13. Conditional numbers: one model throughout

The following table uses the headline House mixture and the disclosed Senate model. Each row shifts all relevant Democratic margins downward by the stated amount; the Senate assumption is separate from the House generic ballot. Uniformity is a stress test, not a claim that every race or intervention moves equally. Senate Republican-control values below are approximate complements, with rare unresolved independent outcomes treated separately in the underlying model.

R margin improvement	House mean D / R	P(R House)	Senate mean D caucus	Approx. P(R Senate)
0 points	236.2 / 198.8	8%	51.1	39%
1 points	232.3 / 202.7	13%	50.2	53%
2 points	228.6 / 206.4	21%	49.3	67%
3 points	225.1 / 209.9	31%	48.5	78%
4 points	221.7 / 213.3	42%	47.6	87%
5 points	218.5 / 216.5	53%	46.7	93%

House: 200,000 draws, seed 20261005; district error scales and 75/25 mixture from Part I; historical member mean changes 2.621 seats per margin point. Senate: 1,000,000 draws, seed 20261004; shared Student t error SD 2.5, df 7, independent normal residuals completing each published SD. Osborn included in the D caucus. Small baseline differences reflect simulation variation and unresolved-affiliation handling.

What the comparison with Claude changes

The attached Claude paper's House strategy table uses the district member alone. Its roughly even Republican control chance after a four-point improvement is not the headline-mixture result. In the mixture, four points yields about 42% Republican control; five points about 53%. The expected Democratic seat count can remain above 218 while the Republican probability exceeds half because the mixture is asymmetric. Expected seats and majority probability are distinct statistics.

A second correction concerns the Senate. Moving all 35 race centers one or two points gives about 53% or 67% Republican control. Applying the same changes only to the six close races identified in Claude's concluding passage gives about 47% or 56%. That check holds every other center fixed and uses identical simulated errors. It illustrates why a national sensitivity cannot be described as the effect of movement in only a handful of races.

The table gives no probability that an improvement occurs. Nor does it assign that improvement to a conventional or extraordinary measure. The probability of adoption, the effect conditional on adoption and the probability of chamber control are separate quantities. Adding nominal gains from overlapping measures would be methodologically unsound.

14. Assuming the President is right: three distinct cases

A strong conditional analysis should grant the premise expressly, rather than quietly convert an allegation into a fact. The useful question is what follows if particular propositions are true. The speech combines propositions with different legal and electoral implications, so a single all-or-nothing assumption conceals the most important distinctions.

Assumption	What follows	What still does not follow
A. Foreign data acquisition, serious vulnerabilities and some registration wrongdoing are true.	Investigations, remediation, records review and verifiable safeguards are substantively justified.	No automatic conclusion about changed winners, current machine control or a need for armed polling-site deployments.
B. Reliable reports were intentionally suppressed for improper political reasons.	Independent oversight, preservation and evaluation of individual responsibility become more urgent.	Guilt of every criticized official, guilt of journalists, or suspension of normal evidentiary and legal requirements.
C. A current, operational compromise can change votes or prevent lawful participation.	Urgent, narrowly matched protective action and continuity measures may be necessary.	An unrestricted presidential power over election administration, or that a particular intrusive response will improve security.

Take the strongest case seriously

Under Case C, inaction could be costly. A system known to be compromised should not be described as safe simply because previous national fraud allegations were weak. Authorities would need to identify the affected component, preserve evidence, maintain a reliable voting path and verify the remedy. An independently documented current threat is much stronger evidence than a general assertion that technology can be attacked.

Yet even a fully true intelligence-cover-up allegation does not establish that physical polling places are where the threat occurs. A copied registration file, a vendor vulnerability, a forged application and an armed attack are different problems. Effective responses must match the demonstrated mechanism. A conspicuous intervention that does not address that mechanism can impose costs while leaving the vulnerability intact.

Political desperation changes incentives, not authority

An administration expecting defeat may be more willing to attempt disruptive action. That is a proposition about behavior, not a justification for lowering the standard of proof or harming lawful participation. Desperation can also increase the probability of overreach, emergency injunctions and institutional conflict. The model should describe those risks without treating them as additional Republican votes.

15. Extraordinary proposals: feasibility and foreseeable fallout

The horizon review finds active disputes over bulk citizenship checking, investigations of election technology, military cyber support, federal monitoring and armed presence near polls. The following are analytical categories, not a deployment or campaign plan. Feasibility means a lawful, meaningful measure could be in operation by November 3, not merely announced.

Proposal	Near-term feasibility under specified conditions	Principal limitation or fallout
Publish corroborated intelligence and a remediation ledger	Relatively high for reviewed material already available.	Source protection, privacy and credibility; selective disclosure can deepen distrust.
Accelerated independent forensic review with evidence preserved	Moderate for a defined system and consenting custodian or lawful order.	Capacity, custody, access and risk of disrupting active equipment; a full national inquiry takes longer.
Federal civilian monitoring or court-authorized observers	Moderate where statutory requirements, staff and access exist.	Monitoring documents compliance; observers do not assume general command of elections.
Individual citizenship verification using available records	Moderate for a manageable, verified caseload.	False matches, notice, correction opportunities, list-maintenance restrictions and ongoing litigation.
New nationwide voting rules immediately before the election	Low for completed, reliable nationwide implementation.	Legislation, litigation, training, documents and votes already cast constrain execution.
Authorized cyber or emergency logistics support	Moderate to high for an existing, properly authorized mission.	Mission and command status matter; support is not authority to police voters.
Armed Guard at polling places based on broad fraud allegations	Very low for a generally lawful program on that premise alone.	Federal and state restrictions, intimidation risk, injunctions and practical mismatch with cyber claims.
Unilateral postponement or general federal takeover	No general authority established by the cited allegations.	Congressional election timing and divided constitutional responsibilities remain operative.

These are broad analytic judgments, not measured probabilities or a ranking of partisan advantage. A validated local emergency can change an assessment; a generalized allegation cannot establish the missing local facts. Legality, staffing, implementation and security effectiveness should each be examined separately. A lawful proposal can fail operationally; an implemented proposal can be enjoined or reversed.

No positive seat credit is assigned to any row. The net political reaction could be favorable, adverse or negligible, while the administrative effect depends on actual scope. The most defensible measurable outcomes are corrected errors, uninterrupted lawful access, tested systems and reliable counts. Sources: DOJ monitoring guidance; EAC contingency resources; September 25 Supreme Court SAVE order; 18 U.S.C. 592; 2 U.S.C. 7.

16. National Guard and polling-place security

The strongest possible justification must be specific

If officials possess credible evidence of an imminent physical attack, the need to protect voters and workers is real. The required response depends on the threat, available civilian capacity and legal authority. That situation must be distinguished from stationing troops at voting locations to demonstrate resolve over generalized fraud allegations. The speech's data and technology allegations do not by themselves establish a physical threat at any polling place.

The governing constraints

18 U.S.C. 592 prohibits covered federal personnel from ordering or controlling troops or armed men at places where elections are held, subject to a narrow armed-enemies exception. Voter intimidation is separately prohibited by 52 U.S.C. 10307(b). The Posse Comitatus Act restricts federal military execution of domestic law absent the required authorization. National Guard command status changes the authority analysis, but does not erase intimidation protections or state election law. (18 U.S.C. 592 and 1385; 52 U.S.C. 10307.)

NCSL's February 2026 review distinguishes state rules allowing civilian police to be requested by election officials from other arrangements. That variation defeats a blanket claim that every uniformed presence is unlawful, and also defeats a blanket claim that any desired deployment is permissible. Presence, mission, conduct and legal authority all matter. A written assertion of election integrity cannot substitute for those requirements. (NCSL, election-law questions.)

Mechanism and consequences

Armed personnel cannot validate an immigration-data match, repair a tabulator or establish the provenance of a copied voter file. At voting entrances, their presence can cause confusion, queues, confrontation or reluctance to participate. Litigation may begin before the deployment and force rapid changes in operational plans. Even if some voters feel reassured, those responses do not establish a positive net effect on confidence, security or election outcomes.

Authorized cyber defense and emergency logistical support away from voter screening present different questions. The September defense announcement concerns foreign-threat intelligence and cyber capacity. It is not a general authorization for election-site policing. A policy analysis should describe the actual mission instead of letting the word Guard collapse several legally and operationally distinct functions into one.

Forecast treatment

There is no empirical basis here for a seat estimate from polling-site troops. A documented disruption could justify local uncertainty, with adverse effects on lawful participation treated as harm rather than a strategic benefit. A deployment that produces no measurable change should produce no forecast adjustment. A legal injunction or delay belongs in the institutional-risk analysis unless it demonstrably changes the electorate or count.

17. Courts, records, citizenship review and emergency procedures

A consequential legal development

On September 25, the Supreme Court granted a stay in *Department of Homeland Security v. League of Women Voters*, No. 26A308, allowing the expanded SAVE system to operate during the appeal. The majority assessed the government as likely to prevail on the disputed data-sharing authority. It also acknowledged a naturalized citizen whose agency records were inaccurate. The order changes access to the system; it does not establish the accuracy of every match or adjudicate every subsequent voter-removal decision. (Supreme Court, September 25.)

That distinction is directly relevant to implementation. Data availability is one stage; identity matching, current citizenship, individual review, notice, correction and lawful disposition are further stages. The 90-day restriction on systematic list maintenance and its statutory exceptions still require analysis. A nationwide headline cannot supply an individual case record. (52 U.S.C. 20507.)

Preservation and independent review

Federal law generally requires preservation of federal-election records for 22 months. DOJ can seek records under applicable statutory authority, and disputes can be brought before courts. Preservation and independently supervised examination are substantively different from removing equipment in a manner that prevents voting or breaks evidentiary custody. A valid investigative objective does not eliminate the need for authority and operational continuity. (52 U.S.C. 20701; DOJ election-record guidance.)

Observers and monitors

DOJ distinguishes its own civil-rights monitoring from federal observers assigned under court authority. Their role is to document compliance, not to direct a partisan eligibility campaign or replace local election administrators. An assessment must identify the governing authority and actual access. Calling someone an observer does not grant powers outside that authority. (DOJ, federal observers and election monitoring; 52 U.S.C. 10302.)

Emergency continuity is different from postponement

EAC guidance treats disasters and interruptions as continuity problems requiring advance planning and coordination. A local outage or threat can require lawful alternatives, accurate public notice and an auditable process. The ordinary federal House election date is fixed by 2 U.S.C. 7. The President's allegation of interference does not itself create a general power to postpone the national congressional election or substitute a federal administration for state systems. The particular remedy must come from applicable law and, when disputed, judicial determination.

All of these measures can have meaningful security value without changing the expected winner. Their consequences should be reported through the number and kind of verified corrections, the quality of evidence, delays avoided or incurred, and the treatment of eligible voters. The model cannot price an unspecified investigation as a national Republican seat gain.

18. Re-emphasizing the speech: evidence, reaction and institutional risk

A further address can inform the country

A subsequent presidential address could report what has been verified since July, explain which allegations remain unresolved and identify completed safeguards. New corroboration can warrant substantially more attention than repetition of previously released material. A serious public presentation would allow the audience to inspect the same evidence, understand contrary findings and distinguish a past breach from a current operational threat. That standard applies regardless of the President's party.

If the allegations are assumed true for a scenario, that assumption belongs in the analysis, not in a factual public claim unless the supporting evidence warrants it. The conditional exercise cannot justify manufacturing certainty. Selective disclosure may generate attention while reducing trust in the eventual investigation. The political effect remains uncertain because support, opposition and confidence in participation may all move at once.

Media disagreement and proposed pressure

The media hypothesis in Part I asks whether editorial choices understated the significance of the release. It does not establish coordinated concealment. Retaliation against broadcasters is a separate issue: 47 U.S.C. 326 denies the FCC a general censorship power and protects free speech by radio communication. Disagreement over carriage of a presidential address does not supply an evidentiary answer to the allegations or a general authority to compel favorable coverage.

Three possible electoral outcomes, without invented probabilities

First, well-substantiated new findings could change perceptions of competence or wrongdoing and move vote intention. Second, improvements in administration could increase confidence and lawful participation without a predictable partisan direction. Third, an intrusive or poorly supported intervention could cause backlash, disruption and litigation. The paper has no causal estimate that selects among these possibilities or assigns a margin effect to any particular proposed action.

A one-point national movement in either direction is consequential in the model, especially for the Senate. That makes careful measurement more important, not less. The scenario table can translate an observed or explicitly assumed margin change; it cannot establish that dramatic action produces such a change. The possibility of a large effect is not evidence of a favorable effect.

Final assessment

Republicans begin from a much stronger conditional chance of Senate control than House control. Conventional developments can still alter those probabilities, but their magnitude has to be established. Extraordinary measures deserve serious analysis when matched to verified threats and lawful authority. Even under strong assumptions favorable to the President's allegations, the case for narrow protection and independent verification is stronger than the inference to unrestricted federal control or armed polling-site presence.

The central forecast therefore remains House 236 D / 199 R and Senate 51 Democratic caucus / 49 R. This two-part analysis identifies conditions under which those estimates should change, distinguishes implementation from electoral effect, and makes uncertainty visible rather than using urgency to fill evidentiary gaps.

About the author

Rodney Malpert holds a J.D. and an M.A. in Government from Cornell University. He completed all doctoral requirements except the dissertation in American government at Cornell and undertook substantial graduate coursework in analytic philosophy. He has served as an adjunct professor at Southern Methodist University School of Law and Arizona State University College of Law, practiced law for many years in Silicon Valley, and worked as a venture capitalist. He is a chess Senior Master. His current Centaur research examines electoral forecasting, political institutions and the disciplined integration of human judgment with AI analysis.

Malpert has been active in Republican political campaigns at the state and national levels and has attended political meetings at Mar-a-Lago. In his corporate legal practice, he has represented many Fortune 500 companies and leading technology companies in public-policy meetings on Capitol Hill. He divides his time among Dallas, Phoenix and Lincoln.

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Attributions: intellectual development and division of work

Rodney Malpert is the author and principal intellectual architect of the inquiry. He identified the questions, proposed the causal mechanisms, challenged weak explanations, pressed for explicit numerical consequences and directed the paper's transition from a forecast alone to a two-part assessment of the situation and possible responses. The following credits distinguish intellectual framing from research assistance and computational implementation.

Historical direction, variable magnitude and comparative tests

Malpert began with the recurrent midterm penalty and asked why its direction is relatively regular while its size varies. He proposed a cost-of-governing mechanism in which executive responsibility and disappointed constituencies create a low-cost opportunity for punishment. He requested comparisons with gubernatorial and subnational elections, presidential reelections and parliamentary electoral cycles. This framing organized the literature review instead of treating a historical average as a sufficient explanation.

Wave amplifiers and model architecture

He distinguished a normal midterm loss from the conditions that produce a wave, identifying approval, economic stress, scandal, war, exposure from a prior landslide and nationalization. He insisted that national vote movement and seat translation be treated separately. His demand for a test on the actual district map led to the 435-district model rather than a forecast assembled solely from professional ratings or national factor adjustments.

Polling, approval and salience

He argued that the generic ballot is a more direct congressional signal than approval alone, while asking that approval and economic conditions explain or challenge it. He sought scrutiny of poll accuracy, transparency, field dates and possible directional error. He pressed for a reconstructible approval coefficient and for explicit disclosure of how much a percentage point changes the result. The analysis distinguishes his hypotheses from the fitted coefficients and judgmental weights used to implement them.

Attributions, continued

Fuel prices, voting rules and geography

Malpert emphasized the unusual salience of fuel prices as frequent, visible purchases and asked whether their persistence could matter beyond standard approval measures. He identified changes in mail voting, identification, citizenship verification, ballot curing, drop boxes, campus access and monitoring as potential mechanisms. He required lawful participation effects to be distinguished from improper voting. His observation that a disputed vote pool can be concentrated in a safe House district while still affecting a statewide total shaped the different House and Senate treatment.

Redistricting, money, turnout and the Senate

He required the map effect to be counted once, distinguished gross opportunities from net partisan consequences, and rejected carrying a House-only adjustment into the Senate. He demanded that money, intensity, war and scandal have an explicit causal pathway before receiving a seat value. He identified the Senate's candidate sensitivity and limited class of races as essential complications. His instruction to count Osborn with the Democratic caucus is implemented as an assumption, with the candidate's win probability kept separate from affiliation accounting.

The address, polarization and extraordinary responses

Malpert insisted that a nationally televised presidential address making grave allegations receive substantive, element-by-element treatment. He proposed the hypothesis that polarization and establishment-media responses muted what might otherwise have become a major historical event, questioned the extent of follow-up, and requested explicit consequences for House and Senate forecasts. He also requested a conditional analysis granting the allegations and examining extraordinary measures, including possible Guard presence, feasibility and fallout. The paper evaluates these questions; attribution of the questions is not a claim that every hypothesis was confirmed.

ChatGPT and Claude

ChatGPT assisted with literature and source retrieval, regression reconstruction, the district and Senate simulations, checks of arithmetic, uncertainty assumptions, document production and the presidential-address review. Claude supplied the prior methodological critique and replication work described in Section 9, and the attached October 5 paper added a substantial conventional-strategy discussion. The present ChatGPT revision reviewed that discussion, retained analytically useful distinctions, corrected the model-comparison and Senate-scope issues, verified the Minnesota calendar inconsistency, checked the September SAVE ruling, and developed the neutral institutional analysis and integrated presentation.

The supplied Claude document is treated as an input to critical review, not as independent evidence that its factual claims or causal estimates are correct. Shared datasets, inherited assumptions and agreement among AI systems do not establish calibration. The human framing, the AI implementations and the external primary evidence should each remain inspectable.

Scope of verification and remaining limits

The reconstruction verifies the disclosed chamber inputs and conditional sensitivities. It does not estimate a campaign-production function, demographic targeting model, return on advertising, probability of criminal guilt or numerical causal effect of the July address. There is no completed out-of-sample calibration. New legal and administrative sources are dated in the bibliography; the underlying forecast remains an October 4 snapshot.

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Appendix A. Historical approval audit

The outcome is the president's party's House seat change. Approval values use early October where listed, with a fall date fallback in the American Presidency Project series. Seats defended use the source's pre-election holdings, which can differ from the prior general election result; this difference is not substituted for the 215 D / 220 R forecast baseline. OLS includes an intercept, approval and seat exposure. Leave-one-out prediction fits on all but one election and predicts the omitted one; it is a limited diagnostic because observations are few and regimes differ. The 0.78 heuristic is treated as a comparison point rather than an exactly replicated specification. The audit reproduced all three fits (slopes 1.136, 1.153, 0.793; leave-one-out errors 18.3, 20.1, 14.5) and their R-squared values of 0.42, 0.53 and 0.89.

Year	Approval %	President-party seats defended	President-party House change
1946	27	244	-56
1950	43	263	-28
1954	62	221	-18
1958	57	203	-48
1962	63	264	-4
1966	44	295	-47
1970	58	192	-12
1974	53	192	-48
1978	49	292	-15
1982	42	192	-26
1986	64	181	-5
1990	57	175	-8
1994	43	258	-54
1998	65	207	4
2002	68	220	8
2006	37	233	-30
2010	45	257	-63
2014	42	201	-13
2018	44	241	-41
2022	42	222	-9

Appendix B. All 35 Senate forecast inputs

Positive margin favors the Democrat except NE, ID, SD and the pooled MT opposition, where it means non-Republican. Existing Democratic caucusing independents are included in the 34 uncontested caucus seats; Osborn is assigned to that caucus if elected; other new independents remain unassigned. SD is total margin standard deviation.

Probabilities are approximate marginal normal calculations; chamber totals use the correlated simulation.

Candidate

order is Democrat or independent opposition / Republican; additional candidates are not exhaustively listed. A displayed 100.0% is rounded, not a claim of certainty; safe race margins are broad priors. FL and OH are special elections. Montana's opposition includes different affiliations, so its tiny non-R probability is treated as affiliation unresolved.

State (held)	Candidates (D or I opposition / R)	Margin	SD	D / non-R win
AK (R)	Peltola / Sullivan	+1.0	5.5	57.2%
AL (R)	Wess / Moore	-30.0	6.0	0.0%
AR (R)	Shoffner / Cotton	-20.0	6.0	0.0%
CO (D)	Hickenlooper / Baisley	+15.0	5.0	99.9%
DE (D)	Coons / Katz	+18.0	5.0	100.0%
FL (R)	Nixon / Moody	-7.0	5.5	10.2%
GA (D)	Ossoff / Collins	+7.0	4.5	94.0%
IA (R)	Turek / Hinson	+0.5	5.0	54.0%
ID (R)	Achilles (I) / Risch	-22.0	7.0	0.1%
IL (D)	Stratton / Tracy	+15.0	5.0	99.9%
KS (R)	Hamilton / Marshall	-3.0	5.5	29.3%
KY (R)	Booker / Barr	-12.0	6.0	2.3%
LA (R)	Davis / Letlow	-20.0	6.0	0.0%
MA (D)	Markey / Deaton	+25.0	5.0	100.0%
ME (R)	Jackson / Collins	+0.0	5.0	50.0%
MI (D)	El-Sayed / Rogers	+2.5	5.0	69.1%
MN (D)	Flanagan / Tafoya	+3.5	5.5	73.8%
MS (R)	Colom / Hyde-Smith	-10.0	6.0	4.8%
MT (R)	Bankhead (D), Bodnar (I) / Alme	-18.0	7.0	0.5%
NC (R)	Cooper / Whatley	+7.0	4.5	94.0%
NE (R)	Osborn (I) / Ricketts	-5.0	6.0	20.2%
NH (D)	Pappas / Sununu	+5.0	4.5	86.7%
NJ (D)	Booker / Murphy	+17.0	5.0	100.0%
NM (D)	Lujan / Marker	+13.0	5.0	99.5%
OH (R)	Brown / Husted	+2.5	4.8	69.9%
OK (R)	Thomas / Hern	-30.0	6.0	0.0%
OR (D)	Merkley / Smith	+18.0	5.0	100.0%
RI (D)	Reed / McKay	+22.0	5.0	100.0%
SC (R)	Andrews / D. Graham	-3.5	6.0	28.0%
SD (R)	Bengs (I) / Rounds	-22.0	7.0	0.1%
TN (R)	Bradshaw / Hagerty	-22.0	6.0	0.0%
TX (R)	Talarico / Paxton	+2.0	5.0	65.5%
VA (D)	Warner / Mizusawa	+12.0	5.0	99.2%

State (held)	Candidates (D or I opposition / R)	Margin	SD	D / non-R win
WV (R)	Fetty Anderson / Capito	-30.0	6.0	0.0%
WY (R)	Byrd / Hageman	-40.0	6.0	0.0%

Appendix C. All 435 House districts

Pres = 2024 presidential D minus R margin on the actual 2026 boundaries. Adj = continuity plus the six disclosed candidate exceptions, in margin points. Center = Pres + 9.5 + Adj at national D+8. pD = approximate marginal structural Democratic win probability under the widened uncertainty scales. Ratings (CPR = Cook Political Report, Sab = Sabato, IE = Inside Elections) are snapshots, not input win probabilities: LD/LR = Likely Democratic/Republican; d/r = Leans Democratic/Republican; TD/TR = Tilt Democratic/Republican; T = Toss-up; S = Safe or unlisted in the competitive table. O marks an open seat. Regions for the regional error term: Northeast/Mid-Atlantic (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT, NY, NJ, PA, DE, MD); Great Lakes (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI); Plains (IA, KS, MN, MO, ND, NE, SD); South (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV); Interior (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NM, NV, OK, TX, UT, WY); Pacific (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA). The district model does not include the historical member's four seat adjustment. The point forecast is an expected seat summary; the table's individually favored candidates are not asserted to be the single most likely jointly realized outcome.

District	Pres	Adj	Center	pD	CPR	Sab	IE
AK-AL	-13	-2	-5.5	14%	LR	LR	LR
AL-01 O	-36	+0	-26.5	<1%	S	S	S
AL-02	-14	+1	-3.5	25%	LR	r	LR
AL-03	-47	-1	-38.5	<1%	S	S	S
AL-04	-66	-1	-57.5	<1%	S	S	S
AL-05	-29	-1	-20.5	<1%	S	S	S
AL-06	-35	-1	-26.5	<1%	S	S	S
AL-07	+18	+1	+28.5	>99%	S	S	S
AR-01	-45	-2	-37.5	<1%	S	S	S
AR-02	-16	-2	-8.5	5%	S	LR	S
AR-03	-25	-2	-17.5	<1%	S	S	S
AR-04	-40	-2	-32.5	<1%	S	S	S
AZ-01 O	-3	+0	+6.5	90%	d	T	T
AZ-02	-15	-2	-7.5	7%	LR	LR	LR
AZ-03	+40	+2	+51.5	>99%	S	S	S
AZ-04	+7	+2	+18.5	>99%	S	S	S
AZ-05 O	-20	+0	-10.5	2%	S	S	S
AZ-06	-1	-2	+6.5	90%	T	T	T
AZ-07	+22	+2	+33.5	>99%	S	S	S
AZ-08	-16	-2	-8.5	5%	S	S	S
AZ-09	-31	-2	-23.5	<1%	S	S	S
CA-01	+12	-1	+20.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-02	+25	+1	+35.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-03 O	+10	+0	+19.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-04	+15	+1	+25.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-05	-21	-1	-12.5	<1%	S	S	S
CA-06 O	+8	+0	+17.5	>99%	S	LD	d
CA-07	+13	+1	+23.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-08	+34	+1	+44.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-09	+11	+1	+21.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-10	+34	+1	+44.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-11 O	+68	+0	+77.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-12	+74	+1	+84.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-13	+0	+1	+10.5	98%	d	d	TD
CA-14	+35	+1	+45.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-15	+48	+1	+58.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-16	+48	+1	+58.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-17	+39	+1	+49.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-18	+28	+1	+38.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-19	+34	+1	+44.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-20	-32	-1	-23.5	<1%	S	S	S
CA-21	+6	+1	+16.5	>99%	LD	LD	S
CA-22	-2	-5	+2.5	69%	T	d	T
CA-23	-19	-1	-10.5	2%	S	S	S
CA-24	+25	+1	+35.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-25	+6	+1	+16.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-26 O	+15	+0	+24.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-27	+10	+1	+20.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-28	+25	+1	+35.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-29	+34	+1	+44.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-30	+40	+1	+50.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-31	+12	+1	+22.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-32	+25	+1	+35.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-33	+10	+1	+20.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-34	+51	+1	+61.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-35	+8	+1	+18.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-36	+39	+1	+49.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-37	+60	+1	+70.5	>99%	S	S	S

District	Pres	Adj	Center	pD	CPR	Sab	IE
MN-08	-14	-2	-6.5	10%	S	S	S
MO-01	+57	+2	+68.5	>99%	S	S	S
MO-02	-8	-2	-0.5	46%	LR	r	S
MO-03	-27	-2	-19.5	<1%	S	S	S
MO-04	-42	-2	-34.5	<1%	S	S	S
MO-05	+23	+2	+34.5	>99%	S	S	S
MO-06 O	-39	+0	-29.5	<1%	S	S	S
MO-07	-43	-2	-35.5	<1%	S	S	S
MO-08	-54	-2	-46.5	<1%	S	S	S
MS-01	-37	-2	-29.5	<1%	S	S	S
MS-02	+20	+2	+31.5	>99%	S	S	S
MS-03	-29	-2	-21.5	<1%	S	S	S
MS-04	-43	-2	-35.5	<1%	S	S	S
MT-01 O	-12	+0	-2.5	31%	r	r	r
MT-02	-30	-2	-22.5	<1%	S	S	S
NC-01	-12	+1	-1.5	39%	r	T	TR
NC-02	+34	+1	+44.5	>99%	S	S	S
NC-03	-14	-1	-5.5	14%	S	S	S
NC-04	+45	+1	+55.5	>99%	S	S	S
NC-05	-18	-1	-9.5	3%	S	S	S
NC-06	-17	-1	-8.5	5%	S	S	S
NC-07	-14	-1	-5.5	14%	S	S	S
NC-08	-19	-1	-10.5	2%	S	S	S
NC-09	-16	-1	-7.5	7%	S	S	S
NC-10	-18	-1	-9.5	3%	S	S	S
NC-11 O	-10	+0	-0.5	46%	T	T	r
NC-12	+46	+1	+56.5	>99%	S	S	S
NC-13	-16	-1	-7.5	7%	S	S	S
NC-14	-15	-1	-6.5	10%	S	S	S
ND-AL	-37	-2	-29.5	<1%	S	S	S
NE-01	-13	-2	-5.5	14%	S	S	S
NE-02 O	+5	+0	+14.5	>99%	d	d	TD
NE-03	-54	-2	-46.5	<1%	S	S	S
NH-01 O	+2	+0	+11.5	99%	LD	d	d
NH-02	+4	+2	+15.5	>99%	S	LD	LD
NJ-01	+19	+2	+30.5	>99%	S	S	S
NJ-02	-13	-2	-5.5	14%	S	S	S
NJ-03	+8	+2	+19.5	>99%	S	S	S
NJ-04	-30	-2	-22.5	<1%	S	S	S
NJ-05	+2	+2	+13.5	>99%	S	S	S
NJ-06	+6	+2	+17.5	>99%	S	S	S
NJ-07	-1	-2	+6.5	90%	d	d	TD
NJ-08	+24	+2	+35.5	>99%	S	S	S
NJ-09	-1	+2	+10.5	98%	LD	LD	LD
NJ-10	+51	+2	+62.5	>99%	S	S	S
NJ-11	+9	+2	+20.5	>99%	S	S	S
NJ-12 O	+24	+0	+33.5	>99%	S	S	S
NM-01	+13	+2	+24.5	>99%	S	S	S
NM-02	-2	+2	+9.5	97%	d	d	TD
NM-03	+5	+2	+16.5	>99%	S	S	S
NV-01	+2	+2	+13.5	>99%	LD	LD	d
NV-02 O	-14	+0	-4.5	19%	LR	LR	LR
NV-03	-1	+2	+10.5	98%	d	d	d
NV-04	+2	+2	+13.5	>99%	LD	LD	LD
NY-01	-10	-2	-2.5	31%	S	LR	S
NY-02	-14	-2	-6.5	10%	S	S	S
NY-03	-4	+2	+7.5	93%	d	d	d
NY-04	+1	+2	+12.5	>99%	d	d	TD

District	Pres	Adj	Center	pD	CPR	Sab	IE
CA-38	+12	+1	+22.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-39	+9	+1	+19.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-40	-12	-1	-3.5	25%	S	S	S
CA-41	+14	-1	+22.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-42	+13	+1	+23.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-43	+49	+1	+59.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-44	+35	+1	+45.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-45	+4	+1	+14.5	>99%	LD	LD	LD
CA-46	+16	+1	+26.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-47	+10	+1	+20.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-48 O	+3	+0	+12.5	>99%	d	d	TD
CA-49	+12	+1	+22.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-50	+18	+1	+28.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-51	+18	+1	+28.5	>99%	S	S	S
CA-52	+18	+1	+28.5	>99%	S	S	S
CO-01 O	+56	+0	+65.5	>99%	S	S	S
CO-02	+40	+2	+51.5	>99%	S	S	S
CO-03	-10	-2	-2.5	31%	LR	LR	LR
CO-04	-18	-2	-10.5	2%	S	LR	S
CO-05	-9	-2	-1.5	39%	r	r	TR
CO-06	+20	+2	+31.5	>99%	S	S	S
CO-07	+15	+2	+26.5	>99%	S	S	S
CO-08	-2	-2	+5.5	86%	T	T	T
CT-01 O	+23	+0	+32.5	>99%	S	S	S
CT-02	+8	+2	+19.5	>99%	S	S	S
CT-03	+14	+2	+25.5	>99%	S	S	S
CT-04	+23	+2	+34.5	>99%	S	S	S
CT-05	+6	+2	+17.5	>99%	S	S	S
DE-AL	+15	+2	+26.5	>99%	S	S	S
FL-01	-37	-1	-28.5	<1%	S	S	S
FL-02 O	-18	+0	-8.5	5%	S	S	S
FL-03	-21	-1	-12.5	<1%	S	S	S
FL-04	-12	-1	-3.5	25%	S	S	S
FL-05	-21	-1	-12.5	<1%	S	S	S
FL-06	-30	-1	-21.5	<1%	S	S	S
FL-07 O	-12	+0	-2.5	31%	LR	LR	LR
FL-08	-16	-1	-7.5	7%	S	S	S
FL-09	-18	+1	-7.5	7%	LR	LR	LR
FL-10	+24	+1	+34.5	>99%	S	S	S
FL-11 O	-16	+0	-6.5	10%	S	S	S
FL-12	-15	-1	-6.5	10%	S	LR	S
FL-13	-13	-1	-4.5	19%	r	LR	r
FL-14	-11	+1	-0.5	46%	T	T	T
FL-15	-20	-1	-11.5	1%	S	S	S
FL-16 O	-14	+0	-4.5	19%	S	LR	LR
FL-17	-22	-1	-13.5	<1%	S	S	S
FL-18	-17	-1	-8.5	5%	S	S	S
FL-19 O	-30	+0	-20.5	<1%	S	S	S
FL-20	+37	+1	+47.5	>99%	S	S	S
FL-21	-16	-1	-7.5	7%	S	S	S
FL-22 O	-10	+0	-0.5	46%	T	r	TR
FL-23	+14	+1	+24.5	>99%	S	S	S
FL-24 O	+39	+0	+48.5	>99%	S	S	S
FL-25	-9	+1	+1.5	61%	T	T	T
FL-26	-18	-1	-9.5	3%	S	S	S
FL-27	-15	-1	-6.5	10%	r	r	r
FL-28	-25	-1	-16.5	<1%	S	S	S
GA-01 O	-16	+0	-6.5	10%	S	S	S

District	Pres	Adj	Center	pD	CPR	Sab	IE
NY-05	+42	+2	+53.5	>99%	S	S	S
NY-06	+6	+2	+17.5	>99%	S	S	S
NY-07 O	+46	+0	+55.5	>99%	S	S	S
NY-08	+44	+2	+55.5	>99%	S	S	S
NY-09	+41	+2	+52.5	>99%	S	S	S
NY-10 O	+60	+0	+69.5	>99%	S	S	S
NY-11	-24	-2	-16.5	<1%	S	S	S
NY-12 O	+64	+0	+73.5	>99%	S	S	S
NY-13 O	+59	+0	+68.5	>99%	S	S	S
NY-14	+32	+2	+43.5	>99%	S	S	S
NY-15	+48	+2	+59.5	>99%	S	S	S
NY-16	+33	+2	+44.5	>99%	S	S	S
NY-17	+1	-5	+5.5	86%	T	T	T
NY-18	+3	+2	+14.5	>99%	S	S	S
NY-19	+2	+2	+13.5	>99%	LD	LD	LD
NY-20	+14	+2	+25.5	>99%	S	S	S
NY-21 O	-21	+0	-11.5	1%	LR	LR	LR
NY-22	+8	+2	+19.5	>99%	S	S	S
NY-23	-21	-2	-13.5	<1%	S	S	S
NY-24	-23	-2	-15.5	<1%	S	S	S
NY-25	+18	+2	+29.5	>99%	S	S	S
NY-26	+19	+2	+30.5	>99%	S	S	S
OH-01	-3	+1	+7.5	93%	d	d	TD
OH-02	-42	-1	-33.5	<1%	S	S	S
OH-03	+40	+1	+50.5	>99%	S	S	S
OH-04	-43	-1	-34.5	<1%	S	S	S
OH-05	-24	-1	-15.5	<1%	S	S	S
OH-06	-35	-1	-26.5	<1%	S	S	S
OH-07	-11	-1	-2.5	31%	T	T	T
OH-08	-16	-1	-7.5	7%	S	S	S
OH-09	-11	+4	+2.5	69%	T	T	TR
OH-10	-8	-1	+0.5	54%	LR	LR	S
OH-11	+55	+1	+65.5	>99%	S	S	S
OH-12	-30	-1	-21.5	<1%	S	S	S
OH-13	+3	+1	+13.5	>99%	LD	LD	S
OH-14	-20	-1	-11.5	1%	S	S	S
OH-15	-10	-1	-1.5	39%	LR	LR	LR
OK-01 O	-22	+0	-12.5	<1%	S	S	S
OK-02	-56	-2	-48.5	<1%	S	S	S
OK-03	-46	-2	-38.5	<1%	S	S	S
OK-04	-33	-2	-25.5	<1%	S	S	S
OK-05	-18	-2	-10.5	2%	S	S	S
OR-01	+38	+2	+49.5	>99%	S	S	S
OR-02	-27	-2	-19.5	<1%	S	S	S
OR-03	+46	+2	+57.5	>99%	S	S	S
OR-04	+12	+2	+23.5	>99%	S	S	S
OR-05	+9	+2	+20.5	>99%	S	LD	S
OR-06	+11	+2	+22.5	>99%	S	S	S
PA-01	+0	-14	-4.5	19%	LR	r	r
PA-02	+36	+2	+47.5	>99%	S	S	S
PA-03 O	+77	+0	+86.5	>99%	S	S	S
PA-04	+16	+2	+27.5	>99%	S	S	S
PA-05	+29	+2	+40.5	>99%	S	S	S
PA-06	+11	+2	+22.5	>99%	S	S	S
PA-07	-3	-2	+4.5	81%	T	d	T
PA-08	-9	-2	-1.5	39%	T	T	T
PA-09	-38	-2	-30.5	<1%	S	S	S
PA-10	-5	-2	+2.5	69%	T	T	T

District	Pres	Adj	Center	pD	CPR	Sab	IE
GA-02	+8	+2	+19.5	>99%	S	S	S
GA-03	-30	-2	-22.5	<1%	S	S	S
GA-04	+52	+2	+63.5	>99%	S	S	S
GA-05	+72	+2	+83.5	>99%	S	S	S
GA-06	+50	+2	+61.5	>99%	S	S	S
GA-07	-22	-2	-14.5	<1%	S	S	S
GA-08	-31	-2	-23.5	<1%	S	S	S
GA-09	-34	-2	-26.5	<1%	S	S	S
GA-10 O	-21	+0	-11.5	1%	S	S	S
GA-11 O	-23	+0	-13.5	<1%	S	S	S
GA-12	-14	-2	-6.5	10%	S	S	S
GA-13	+42	+2	+53.5	>99%	S	S	S
GA-14	-37	-2	-29.5	<1%	S	S	S
HI-01	+25	+2	+36.5	>99%	S	S	S
HI-02	+22	+2	+33.5	>99%	S	S	S
IA-01	-8	-2	-0.5	46%	T	d	TD
IA-02 O	-10	+0	-0.5	46%	r	T	TR
IA-03	-4	-2	+3.5	75%	T	T	TD
IA-04 O	-31	+0	-21.5	<1%	S	S	S
ID-01	-45	-2	-37.5	<1%	S	S	S
ID-02	-27	-2	-19.5	<1%	S	S	S
IL-01	+32	+2	+43.5	>99%	S	S	S
IL-02 O	+33	+0	+42.5	>99%	S	S	S
IL-03	+31	+2	+42.5	>99%	S	S	S
IL-04 O	+28	+0	+37.5	>99%	S	S	S
IL-05	+37	+2	+48.5	>99%	S	S	S
IL-06	+5	+2	+16.5	>99%	S	S	S
IL-07 O	+65	+0	+74.5	>99%	S	S	S
IL-08 O	+7	+0	+16.5	>99%	S	S	S
IL-09 O	+37	+0	+46.5	>99%	S	S	S
IL-10	+22	+2	+33.5	>99%	S	S	S
IL-11	+11	+2	+22.5	>99%	S	S	S
IL-12	-43	-2	-35.5	<1%	S	S	S
IL-13	+10	+2	+21.5	>99%	S	S	S
IL-14	+5	+2	+16.5	>99%	S	S	S
IL-15	-40	-2	-32.5	<1%	S	S	S
IL-16	-23	-2	-15.5	<1%	S	S	S
IL-17	+5	+2	+16.5	>99%	S	S	S
IN-01	+0	+2	+11.5	99%	LD	LD	LD
IN-02	-27	-2	-19.5	<1%	S	S	S
IN-03	-31	-2	-23.5	<1%	S	S	S
IN-04	-29	-2	-21.5	<1%	S	S	S
IN-05	-17	-2	-9.5	3%	S	S	S
IN-06	-33	-2	-25.5	<1%	S	S	S
IN-07	+41	+2	+52.5	>99%	S	S	S
IN-08	-36	-2	-28.5	<1%	S	S	S
IN-09	-30	-2	-22.5	<1%	S	S	S
KS-01	-31	-2	-23.5	<1%	S	S	S
KS-02	-20	-2	-12.5	<1%	S	S	S
KS-03	+4	+2	+15.5	>99%	S	S	S
KS-04	-23	-2	-15.5	<1%	S	S	S
KY-01	-47	-2	-39.5	<1%	S	S	S
KY-02	-41	-2	-33.5	<1%	S	S	S
KY-03	+19	+2	+30.5	>99%	S	S	S
KY-04 O	-36	+0	-26.5	<1%	S	S	S
KY-05	-64	-2	-56.5	<1%	S	S	S
KY-06 O	-15	+0	-5.5	14%	LR	r	r
LA-01	-38	-1	-29.5	<1%	S	S	S

District	Pres	Adj	Center	pD	CPR	Sab	IE
PA-11	-21	-2	-13.5	<1%	S	S	S
PA-12	+19	+2	+30.5	>99%	S	S	S
PA-13	-46	-2	-38.5	<1%	S	S	S
PA-14	-33	-2	-25.5	<1%	S	S	S
PA-15	-38	-2	-30.5	<1%	S	S	S
PA-16	-23	-2	-15.5	<1%	S	S	S
PA-17	+6	+2	+17.5	>99%	S	S	S
RI-01	+22	+2	+33.5	>99%	S	S	S
RI-02	+7	+2	+18.5	>99%	S	S	S
SC-01 O	-13	+0	-3.5	25%	LR	LR	LR
SC-02	-14	-2	-6.5	10%	S	S	S
SC-03	-43	-2	-35.5	<1%	S	S	S
SC-04	-24	-2	-16.5	<1%	S	S	S
SC-05 O	-23	+0	-13.5	<1%	S	S	S
SC-06	+23	+2	+34.5	>99%	S	S	S
SC-07	-26	-2	-18.5	<1%	S	S	S
SD-AL O	-29	+0	-19.5	<1%	S	S	S
TN-01	-58	-1	-49.5	<1%	S	S	S
TN-02	-34	-1	-25.5	<1%	S	S	S
TN-03	-36	-1	-27.5	<1%	S	S	S
TN-04	-24	-1	-15.5	<1%	S	S	S
TN-05 O	-23	+0	-13.5	<1%	S	S	S
TN-06 O	-27	+0	-17.5	<1%	S	S	S
TN-07	-22	-1	-13.5	<1%	S	S	S
TN-08	-20	-1	-11.5	1%	S	S	S
TN-09 O	-21	+0	-11.5	1%	S	S	S
TX-01	-50	-1	-41.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-02 O	-23	+0	-13.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-03	-23	-1	-14.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-04	-25	-1	-16.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-05	-22	-1	-13.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-06	-23	-1	-14.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-07	+23	+1	+33.5	>99%	S	S	S
TX-08 O	-28	+0	-18.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-09 O	-20	+0	-10.5	2%	LR	LR	LR
TX-10 O	-23	+0	-13.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-11	-34	-1	-25.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-12	-24	-1	-15.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-13	-46	-1	-37.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-14	-24	-1	-15.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-15	-18	-1	-9.5	3%	T	T	TR
TX-16	+16	+1	+26.5	>99%	S	S	S
TX-17	-22	-1	-13.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-18	+55	+1	+65.5	>99%	S	S	S
TX-19 O	-52	+0	-42.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-20	+29	+1	+39.5	>99%	S	S	S
TX-21 O	-22	+0	-12.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-22 O	-22	+0	-12.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-23 O	-15	+0	-5.5	14%	LR	LR	LR
TX-24	-16	-1	-7.5	7%	S	S	S
TX-25	-24	-1	-15.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-26	-24	-1	-15.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-27	-21	-1	-12.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-28	-10	+3	+2.5	69%	d	d	TD
TX-29	+30	+1	+40.5	>99%	S	S	S
TX-30 O	+47	+0	+56.5	>99%	S	S	S
TX-31	-22	-1	-13.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-32 O	-18	+0	-8.5	5%	S	S	S

District	Pres	Adj	Center	pD	CPR	Sab	IE
LA-02	+47	+1	+57.5	>99%	S	S	S
LA-03	-36	-1	-27.5	<1%	S	S	S
LA-04	-34	-1	-25.5	<1%	S	S	S
LA-05 O	-34	+0	-24.5	<1%	S	S	S
LA-06 O	-30	+0	-20.5	<1%	S	S	S
MA-01	+14	+2	+25.5	>99%	S	S	S
MA-02	+24	+2	+35.5	>99%	S	S	S
MA-03	+19	+2	+30.5	>99%	S	S	S
MA-04	+20	+2	+31.5	>99%	S	S	S
MA-05	+45	+2	+56.5	>99%	S	S	S
MA-06 O	+21	+0	+30.5	>99%	S	S	S
MA-07	+63	+2	+74.5	>99%	S	S	S
MA-08	+26	+2	+37.5	>99%	S	S	S
MA-09	+11	+2	+22.5	>99%	S	S	S
MD-01	-17	-2	-9.5	3%	S	S	S
MD-02	+18	+2	+29.5	>99%	S	S	S
MD-03	+24	+2	+35.5	>99%	S	S	S
MD-04	+74	+2	+85.5	>99%	S	S	S
MD-05 O	+33	+0	+42.5	>99%	S	S	S
MD-06	+6	+2	+17.5	>99%	S	S	S
MD-07	+59	+2	+70.5	>99%	S	S	S
MD-08	+56	+2	+67.5	>99%	S	S	S
ME-01	+22	+2	+33.5	>99%	S	S	S
ME-02 O	-9	+0	+0.5	54%	LR	r	LR
MI-01	-21	-2	-13.5	<1%	S	S	S
MI-02	-30	-2	-22.5	<1%	S	S	S
MI-03	+8	+2	+19.5	>99%	S	S	LD
MI-04	-6	-2	+1.5	61%	r	T	TR
MI-05	-27	-2	-19.5	<1%	S	S	S
MI-06	+23	+2	+34.5	>99%	S	S	S
MI-07	-1	-2	+6.5	90%	T	T	T
MI-08	-2	+2	+9.5	97%	LD	LD	S
MI-09	-32	-2	-24.5	<1%	S	S	S
MI-10 O	-7	+0	+2.5	69%	T	T	TR
MI-11 O	+16	+0	+25.5	>99%	S	S	S
MI-12	+38	+2	+49.5	>99%	S	S	S
MI-13 O	+41	+0	+50.5	>99%	S	S	S
MN-01	-12	-2	-4.5	19%	LR	LR	r
MN-02 O	+6	+0	+15.5	>99%	LD	LD	LD
MN-03	+21	+2	+32.5	>99%	S	S	S
MN-04	+36	+2	+47.5	>99%	S	S	S
MN-05	+62	+2	+73.5	>99%	S	S	S
MN-06	-20	-2	-12.5	<1%	S	S	S
MN-07	-36	-2	-28.5	<1%	S	S	S

District	Pres	Adj	Center	pD	CPR	Sab	IE
TX-33 O	+33	+0	+42.5	>99%	S	S	S
TX-34	-10	+1	+0.5	54%	T	d	T
TX-35 O	-10	+0	-0.5	46%	r	r	r
TX-36	-25	-1	-16.5	<1%	S	S	S
TX-37 O	+57	+0	+66.5	>99%	S	S	S
TX-38 O	-21	+0	-11.5	1%	S	S	S
UT-01	+24	-1	+32.5	>99%	S	S	S
UT-02	-29	-1	-20.5	<1%	S	S	S
UT-03	-41	-1	-32.5	<1%	S	S	S
UT-04 O	-33	+0	-23.5	<1%	S	S	S
VA-01	-5	-2	+2.5	69%	r	T	r
VA-02	+0	-2	+7.5	93%	T	d	T
VA-03	+35	+2	+46.5	>99%	S	S	S
VA-04	+33	+2	+44.5	>99%	S	S	S
VA-05	-12	-2	-4.5	19%	LR	r	LR
VA-06	-24	-2	-16.5	<1%	S	S	S
VA-07	+3	+2	+14.5	>99%	LD	LD	LD
VA-08	+50	+2	+61.5	>99%	S	S	S
VA-09	-44	-2	-36.5	<1%	S	S	S
VA-10	+8	+2	+19.5	>99%	S	S	S
VA-11	+34	+2	+45.5	>99%	S	S	S
VT-AL	+32	+2	+43.5	>99%	S	S	S
WA-01	+29	+2	+40.5	>99%	S	S	S
WA-02	+24	+2	+35.5	>99%	S	S	S
WA-03	-3	+4	+10.5	98%	T	d	T
WA-04 O	-21	+0	-11.5	1%	S	S	S
WA-05	-11	-2	-3.5	25%	S	S	S
WA-06	+19	+2	+30.5	>99%	S	S	S
WA-07	+75	+2	+86.5	>99%	S	S	S
WA-08	+6	+2	+17.5	>99%	S	S	S
WA-09	+41	+2	+52.5	>99%	S	S	S
WA-10	+18	+2	+29.5	>99%	S	S	S
WI-01	-5	-2	+2.5	69%	r	LR	LR
WI-02	+40	+2	+51.5	>99%	S	S	S
WI-03	-7	-2	+0.5	54%	T	T	T
WI-04	+52	+2	+63.5	>99%	S	S	S
WI-05	-22	-2	-14.5	<1%	S	S	S
WI-06	-16	-2	-8.5	5%	S	S	S
WI-07 O	-23	+0	-13.5	<1%	S	S	S
WI-08	-16	-2	-8.5	5%	S	S	S
WV-01	-44	-2	-36.5	<1%	S	S	S
WV-02	-40	-2	-32.5	<1%	S	S	S
WY-AL O	-46	+0	-36.5	<1%	S	S	S